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This case study is part of the CEPS project ‘Climate for Sustainable Growth’, whose main objective is to 
analyse the impacts of climate change mitigation measures on the three pillars of sustainable 
development: the economic, environmental and social dimensions.  
It does so by looking at the positive as well as negative, both intended and unintended, impacts of 
climate change mitigation policies and projects. While this case study fully recognizes that policies 
have both positive and negative impacts, the focus of is on (potential) negative impacts of climate 
change mitigation policies.  
The structure of this case study comprises of four sections:  
 (1) Country characteristics,  
(2) Climate-related policies,  
(3) Environmental, social and economic impacts of climate mitigation policies,  
(4) Measures to mitigate impacts of mitigation policies, 
This case study, and the methodology it follows, are not intended to analyse the merit of the policies 
and measures that are being implemented, or their effectiveness and efficiency, but will focus on their 
socio-economic-environmental impacts, and measures to alleviate these impacts in the period of 
transition.  
It is important to note that lack of information and analysis of impacts and tools to mitigate negative 
impacts can act as a brake on ambitious climate action. This case study and the overall project’s focus 
should be seen in this light. 
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Executive Summary  
This study is part of the project entitled “Climate for Sustainable Growth“ and focuses on whether 
climate mitigation policies and projects, implemented for the transition of Poland to a low GHG 
economy, are put in place in a sustainable way, by identifying their impacts on the three dimensions of 
sustainable development 1) economic 2) social and 3) environmental dimension. This is critical for the 
efficiency of implementation with which mitigation measures can be implemented, for the buy-in they 
receive from stakeholders and for ensuring that they meet the conditions for sustainable development, 
which implies there is progress on all three dimensions in a harmonious way. 
This study looks at the positive and negative impacts of climate change mitigation polices and projects, 
and takes into account both domestic and international policies. After identifying the impacts, this 
study focuses on the domestic and international measures that are put in place to mitigate the 
(potential) negative impacts, both domestic, as well as international. 
Given the broadness of the topic, this study sets boundaries through the selection of a limited number 
of sectors and policies on which the project will focus. The study looks at the following two sectors:  
 Electricity generation sector 
 Iron and steel sector 
This study identified several international, European level and domestic climate change policies that 
impact Poland. For practical reasons, and to keep the empirical evidence to a manageable size, the 
impacts of two climate change policies, a) the EU emissions trading system (EU ETS) and b) domestic 
renewable support (RES) policies were chosen from an extensive list.  
The positive and negative impacts of these two climate change policies are analysed in various areas 
(costs, employment, trade, investments, production & capacity, prices, environment), to ensure that all 
three dimensions of sustainable development are covered. 
This study finds that climate change mitigation policies result in both positive and negative impacts on 
the three dimensions of sustainable development. However, the study shows that some potential 
impacts did not materialise due to mitigation measures that were put in place.  
Firstly, for the electricity sector, this study finds that climate change policies have had both positive as 
well as negative impacts. The direct costs of the EU ETS have not produced a major impact in the 
electricity sector. On the other hand, thanks to high levels of free allocation and a very high pass-
through rate, the EU ETS has likely resulted in substantial windfall profits for the sector, at least in the 
period 2008-2012. Since free allocation mechanisms of EU ETS are changing post-2020, in the future 
the direct costs will increase, while windfall profits are likely to slowly disappear. 
As the costs of EU ETS have been passed through, it is very likely that this climate change policy has had 
an impact on electricity prices increasing the cost of electricity for households and industry. This impact 
is both economic and social since it is likely to cause an increase in electricity bills for Polish consumers.  
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This study finds that GHG emissions from Polish electricity sector have decreased from 2008 to 2014. 
Although this trend could have been the result of many causes (including lower energy generation due 
to the financial crisis combined with others e.g. clean air policy), the EU ETS has quite likely played 
some role in GHG emission reductions in the Polish electricity sector, therefore generating a positive 
environmental impact. To quantify the cause-effect equation is a complex task that would require a 
substantial number of assumptions.  
RES in Poland have also had both positive and negative impacts. The positive economic impacts are the 
incentives for investment in renewable energy driving job creation and increase in renewable energy 
production. While difficult to quantify due to lack of data, this has created employment, which has 
generated a positive economic and social impact.  
On the other hand, the green certificates scheme has had economic impacts. It has, as planned, 
initiated changing of the technology and fuel mix in electricity generation away from coal and lignite 
towards renewable energy, namely to biomass and (to some extent) wind power. The additional cost is 
passed on to electricity consumers.  
Therefore, like the EU ETS, the RES support policies have had a social impact by generating higher 
electricity prices for consumers. On the other hand, RES policies have likely played some role not only 
in GHG emission reduction in the Polish electricity sector, but also in reducing other types of emissions 
from power plants, such as Sulphur dioxide nitrous oxides and particulate matters (dust).  
When it comes to electricity generation from hard coal and lignite, RES policies can have some negative 
economic and social impact, due to limiting the demand of electricity generated from these sources, 
and directly related employment, at those facilities. However, since a large part of biomass in Poland is 
biomass combustible, this impact could be compensated to some extent by the employment gains in 
that sector and should not be overstated. 
Secondly, climate change policies have had both positive and negative impacts on the Polish steel and 
iron sector. The direct and indirect costs of EU ETS to the steel and iron sector have been low overall, 
but not insignificant in all cases.  
Therefore, in the short-term, it is safe to say that the sector has not experienced major negative 
economic impacts due to EU ETS. Due to strong measures to avoid carbon leakage, the sector has 
actually benefited from windfall profits, certainly during the 2008-2012 period. Since the EU ETS is 
being strengthened at the EU level, in the long term, it is likely that we will see increasing negative 
economic impacts.  
At the same time, EU ETS has resulted in some environmental gains, as it has been responsible for 
some of the GHG emissions reductions that the iron and steel sector has seen in the period 2008 – 
2014.  
This study finds that flanking measures (measures to mitigate social, economic and environmental 
impacts) were put in place in Poland, which significantly decreased the level of the impacts observed in 
the two sectors selected for this case study.  
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The EU level flanking measure used is free allocation of EUAs granted to installations in both the 
electricity and iron and steel sectors, which significantly mitigated the potential negative economic 
impacts of EU ETS for both sectors. Even though free allocations shielded the two sectors from the 
impacts of EU ETS, it did not prevent the impacts totally, and could not shield consumers of electricity 
faced with price increases. 
Also, international flanking measures, such as World Bank support, and Joint Implementation projects, 
were also identified, and provided funds. As industrial players in the EU ETS were allowed access to 
international credits, which are generally cheaper than EUAs, this is also an important cost mitigation 
measure.  
In addition, further EU-level and international tools were identified (NER 300 for renewable energy and 
CCS projects, the Proposed EU ETS Modernization Fund (post-2020), EU-level R&D funding (such as 
Horizon 2020 funding)) which Poland can use to mitigate the impacts of climate change policies.  
Domestic mitigation tools, such as Green Investment Scheme, the legislation on Thermo-modernization 
Programme and Fund, as well as support for micro-installations under the 2015 Renewable Energy Act, 
all serve to mitigate the impacts of rising electricity prices for households.  
The various programmes under which subsidies are granted to the coal industry have alleviated many 
of the social (employment) concerns within the coal sector in Poland, and demonstrated the 
importance of social dialogue and the availability of a domestic and EU safety net.  
In summary, many negative impacts were mitigated, while recognising that at this time policies are 
young and EUA prices are low, and therefore impacts remained small. However, both climate change 
policies discussed in this study are going through changes as the result of the various pieces of 
legislation being currently examined in the EU. This might mean that in the future these policies can 
generate bigger impacts for the electricity and iron & steel sectors.  
One of the lessons learned from this case study is that there are flanking measures in place in Poland to 
address the negative impacts of the transition that has taken place during the last decades towards a 
market economy. This gives an indication of the importance of having a safety net in place to address 
possible negative impacts resulting from climate change policies, as well as the fact that there is little 
attention given to potential impacts outside Poland, and whether other jurisdictions, or internationally, 
such safety nets exist.  
It must be emphasized that this discussion must not be in any way be interpreted or construed as 
encouraging lack of mitigation action. On the contrary, it must be seen as providing a way forward that 
will ensure that action can be undertaken with full support by all stakeholders, domestic and 
international. 
  
vi 
Table of Contents 
1 Country characteristics ....................................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Drivers of transition to a low GHG economy .............................................................................. 1 
1.2 Energy consumption, electricity generation and key sectors of the Polish economy ................ 3 
1.3 Sector selection ........................................................................................................................... 6 
1.4 Concerns related to implementation of climate policies in Poland ............................................ 6 
1.4.1 Economic concerns ............................................................................................................. 6 
1.4.2 Social concerns .................................................................................................................... 7 
1.4.3 Political concerns ................................................................................................................ 7 
1.5 Conclusion on the socio-economic and environmental evolutions in Poland ............................ 7 
2 Climate change mitigation policies .................................................................................................... 7 
2.1 International policies .................................................................................................................. 8 
2.2 EU policies ................................................................................................................................... 9 
2.3 National policies .......................................................................................................................... 9 
2.3.1 Are impacts of climate change policies monitored? ......................................................... 11 
2.4 Conclusion on climate change policies ..................................................................................... 11 
3 Impacts of climate change mitigation policies ................................................................................. 12 
3.1 Impacts in the electricity generation sector ............................................................................. 12 
3.1.1 Sector description ............................................................................................................. 12 
3.1.2 Economic impacts ............................................................................................................. 13 
3.1.3 Social impacts .................................................................................................................... 22 
3.1.4 Environmental impacts ..................................................................................................... 23 
3.2 Impacts in the iron & steel sector ............................................................................................. 25 
3.2.1 Sector description ............................................................................................................. 25 
3.2.2 Economic impacts ............................................................................................................. 26 
3.2.3 Social Impacts ................................................................................................................... 36 
3.2.4 Environmental impacts ..................................................................................................... 37 
4 Mitigation of impacts of climate change policies ............................................................................ 39 
4.1 Domestic mitigation tools ......................................................................................................... 39 
4.1.1 Green Investment Scheme ................................................................................................ 39 
4.1.2 Thermo-modernisation Fund ............................................................................................ 40 
4.1.3 Support for micro-installations under the 2015 Renewable Energy Act .......................... 40 
4.1.4 Coal industry subsidies ...................................................................................................... 41 
vii 
4.1.5 Iron & steel restructuring packages .................................................................................. 42 
4.2 EU-level tools ............................................................................................................................ 42 
4.2.1 Free allocation in the EU ETS ............................................................................................ 42 
4.2.2 State aid to mitigate indirect costs from the EU ETS ........................................................ 46 
4.2.3 Operational Programme Infrastructure and Environment for the years 2007-13 and 
2014-20 46 
4.3 International tools .................................................................................................................... 46 
4.3.1 World Bank support .......................................................................................................... 46 
4.3.2 DM and Joint Implementation .......................................................................................... 46 
4.4 Potential international and EU-level mitigation tools .............................................................. 47 
5 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................ 48 
References ................................................................................................................................................ 49 
Annex I: International, EU level and national level climate related policies ............................................ 55 
 
 
 
 
 1 
Country case study – Poland 
Climate for Sustainable Growth  
Andrei Marcu, Project Leader 
Tomasz Chruszczow  
David Belis 
Katja Tuokko 
Wijnand Stoefs 
1 Country characteristics 
1.1 Drivers of transition to a low GHG economy  
Up until the late 1980s, Poland was part of the Soviet bloc, with a centrally planned economy 
based mostly on heavy industry. A rapid political, economic and social transformation started in 
1989, after the first (partly) democratic elections. This opening chapter looks at the most 
significant factors that have driven the transition towards a low-GHG economy in Poland. 
Firstly, the need to modernise the economy and the development of innovation potential in the 
market for green technologies has been the most important internal driver of transition to a 
low-GHG economy. Since 1989, the ‘deep’ reconstruction of the economy resulted in an 
increase of energy efficiency due to organisational, technical and technological changes in the 
manufacturing processes. This, in turn resulted in a reduction of carbon as well as other GHG 
emissions (Figure 1). This abrupt decrease of GHG emissions is one the most remarkable results 
of Poland’s economic modernisation in the last 25 years. In 1989, according to the UNFCCC, total 
GHG emissions excluding LULUCF amounted to 551 million tonnes of CO2-eq, while in 2012, they 
stood at 399 million tonnes, representing a reduction of 27.5% between 1989 and 2012.  
Compared to the rest of Europe, however, the energy intensity of the Polish economy remains 
high. Poland ranks seventh from the bottom among EU member states. According to Eurostat 
data, in 2010, the energy intensity of the Polish economy was 373.9 kgoe/€1,000 compared to 
168 kgoe/€1,000 for the EU-27. 
  
                                                          
 Andrei Marcu is Head of Carbon Market Forum at CEPS. Tomasz Chruszczow (Polish Foundation for Climate Change), 
Wijnand Stoefs is Research Assistant at CEPS Carbon Market Forum, David Belis is Research Assistant at CEPS Carbon 
Market Forum and Katja Tuokko is Research Assistant at CEPS Carbon Market Forum.  
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Figure 1. Changes in greenhouse gas emissions in Poland, 1989-2012 
 
Data source: UNFCCC. 
 
Secondly, after a decade of reforms, Poland became a member state of the European Union in 
2004. As a member of the EU, Poland is required to transpose European legislation into national 
laws. This membership in the EU is the single-most important external factor driving the 
transition to a low-GHG emissions economy.  
Poland certainly has a strong voice in the policy-making process at the EU level and has 
influenced the outcomes at various points in time. Poland believes that the adoption of a single 
approach and single timeline for every EU member state, irrespectively of their energy mix, 
structure of power system as well as ability to cover the costs, is not the way forward. Poland 
did not agree, for instance, with the 2050 Roadmap to a low-carbon economy, proposed in 
2011. There are also issues with the timely implementation and transposition of European rules 
at the domestic level (Skjaerseth, 2014). Generally speaking, the dynamics at the European level 
are nevertheless driving much of the transition at the national level, particularly during the last 
10-15 years. 
Other external drivers include building a geopolitical position and international reputation for 
the state in international forums, changing patterns of consumption and related export 
opportunities for green technologies. 
In addition, some of the local governments are more open to the development of ‘decentralised’ 
renewable energy systems (as opposed to the large energy firms) that support the development 
of biomass co-firing in their coal-fired power plants. The development of democratic pluralism is 
relevant here, particularly in terms of stakeholder involvement in climate governance, as public 
concerns are more likely to be taken into account than previously. Environmental groups drive 
the transition by means of attempting to generate social and political pressure, and aim to 
tackle the generally rather low level of climate awareness in Poland.  
A final driver is related to Poland’s vulnerability to the adverse effects of climate change on the 
domestic economy. Particular attention is paid to the real threats posed by climate change 
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 3 
disasters reinforced by phenomena like floods, droughts, forest fires and extreme weather 
events. 
1.2 Energy consumption, electricity generation and key sectors of the Polish economy  
In view of its large domestic coal deposits, it is not surprising that over 50% of Poland’s energy is 
sourced from hard coal and lignite (see Figure 2). In recent years, however, hard-coal extraction 
has fallen, due to variety of reasons such as old mines becoming unprofitable and energy-saving 
technologies decreasing demand of coal.  
Figure 2. Primary energy consumption by fuel type in Poland, 1990-1010 
 
Source: EEA (2014). 
In terms of the electricity mix, Poland relies on domestic coal and lignite for about 84% of total 
generation (for the year 2014, based on data obtained from the Energy Regulatory Office).1 The 
remaining 16% is split mainly between natural gas and biomass (co-firing), in addition to 
hydropower (little growth potential) and wind (whose share is growing). There are plans to 
promote and diversify power generation, including by developing nuclear power and increasing 
the shares of combustible renewables, wind power and natural gas (Figure 3). Due to high (and 
rising) costs, the future of nuclear in Poland is not yet guaranteed (stakeholder interviews). 
  
                                                          
1 This figure excludes electricity generated and used directly by industrial plants. 
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Figure 3. Electricity generation in Poland, 1973-2030 
 
Source: IEA (2011, p. 63). 
 
Following a decrease in total GDP in 1989 and 1990, the Polish economy started to grow again 
from the early 1990s and nearly tripled in size by 2013 (see Figure 4), at an average annual 
growth rate of around 4%. 
The broader economic transition resulted in a decoupling of emissions and economic growth, 
with emissions just above 70% of 1989 levels in 2012, while the size of the economy nearly 
tripled (see Figures 1 and 4). 
Currently, industry remains the dominant sector generating economic growth in Poland. The 
highest growth rate can be found in the manufacturing industry (including e.g. chemicals, 
machinery, iron & steel, cars and textiles), which determines the growth rate of industry as a 
whole. 
Figure 4. Evolution of total GDP in Poland, 1989-2013 (€ billion) 
 
Data sources: EUROSTAT 2015 and UN STAT 2015. 
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Table 1 shows the main sectors of the Polish economy (as shares of gross value added per year). 
Between 1995 and 2011, agriculture decreased in importance (nearly 4%), while services 
increased as a share of total gross value added (about 5%). In industry, the manufacture of basic 
metals and metal products, including iron & steel, and the manufacture of rubber, plastics and 
other non-metallic products, including cement, stand out as major sectors (< 2%). Mining and 
quarrying decreased about 1% as a share of global value added during this period. 
Table 1. Shares of gross added value, per sector, per NACE code, 1995-2011 
 
1995 2000 2005 2010 2011 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 7.92% 4.95% 4.59% 3.74% 4.03% 
Mining and quarrying 3.69% 2.41% 2.54% 2.45% 2.74% 
Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products 0.06% 0.57% 0.75% 0.70% 0.87% 
Manufacture of wood, paper, printing and reproduction 2.04% 1.76% 1.59% 1.48% 1.51% 
Manufacture of basic metals and metal products (incl. 
iron & steel) 2.44% 1.95% 2.14% 2.08% 2.47% 
Manufacture of rubber, plastics and other non-metallic 
mineral products (incl. cement) 2.13% 2.37% 2.35% 2.31% 2.34% 
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 1.30% 0.99% 0.97% 0.83% 0.94% 
Other manufactured goods 11.76% 9.58% 9.95% 9.40% 9.27% 
Construction 7.67% 7.82% 6.29% 8.10% 8.23% 
Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 3.21% 2.59% 3.11% 3.53% 3.38% 
Transportation and storage 4.67% 5.14% 5.52% 5.51% 5.68% 
Services 56.49% 63.85% 63.75% 62.91% 61.58% 
Total Gross Value Added 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
Data source: EUROSTAT 2015. 
Sectoral GHG emissions for the year 2012 show that electricity, gas and steam account for 43% 
of total national emissions, followed by manufacturing industries at 19%. Agriculture, forestry 
and fishing are also quite important (15%), followed by services (12%) and transport (7%). 
Mining and quarrying, finally, account for about 4% total domestic emissions (see Figure 5). 
Figure 5. Sectoral GHG emissions in Poland, 2012 
 
Data source: EUROSTAT 2015. 
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1.3 Sector selection 
In addressing climate change all sectors of the economy need to contribute. However, from a 
methodological point of view, this study will set boundaries through the selection of a limited 
number of sectors. 
The sectors are selected based on two criteria: 1) the contribution of the sector to Poland’s GHG 
emissions and 2) the importance of the sector for the Polish economy. The application of these 
two criteria results in the selection of two sectors:  
 Electricity generation  
 Iron and steel 
 
Electricity generation is very important in the economy, as it fuels growth in a variety of sectors 
(including services and industry) and sustains society’s electricity needs (e.g. households and 
public lighting). Electricity accounted for 43% of total domestic emissions in 2012 (EUROSTAT, 
2015; Figure 5) and accounted for over 3% of total value added (EUROSTAT, 2015; Table 1). 
The iron & steel sector is also an important part of Poland’s energy-intensive manufacturing 
industry. Manufacturing as a whole accounted for 19% of total domestic emissions in 2012, 
second only to electricity (EUROSTAT, 2015; see Figure 5). The manufacture of basic metals and 
metal products (including iron & steel) accounted for 2.47 % of total value added in 2011 
(EUROSTAT, 2015; Table 1). 
Both sectors have evolved considerably since the start of reforms and modernisation in 1989, 
and are continuing to adapt to these new circumstances. It is against this larger background that 
initiatives aimed at putting these sectors on a low GHG pathway need to be analysed.  
1.4 Concerns related to implementation of climate policies in Poland 
There exist a number of serious concerns in Poland that may hinder the transformation towards 
a low-GHG economy. These concerns can be identified as economic, social and political in 
nature and are elaborated below. 
1.4.1 Economic concerns 
An overarching concern is international competitiveness and potential carbon leakage, which 
essentially means relocation of production or investments to third countries. Implementation of 
climate policies can lead to carbon leakage, which would mean GHG emissions being displaced 
to a country where less constraining climate change policies are in place. 
Another major economic concern is energy security. The IEA (2011, p. 24) states: “a driving force 
for Poland’s energy policy is high dependence on Russia for energy imports. In 2007, Poland 
imported 97% of its needs in oil and 68% of its needs in gas”. Poland aims to reduce its 
dependency on Russia and therefore needs to diversify its energy sources and supply routes for 
example by building an entry point for liquefied natural gas to be delivered from the Gulf area. 
However diversification has so far proven difficult and Poland remains therefore committed to 
(domestic) coal.  
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1.4.2 Social concerns 
As the implementation of ambitious climate policies may severely affect the manufacturing and 
energy industries, not to mention the coal-mining industry, there are widespread fears that 
these policies may lead to significant job losses in these sectors. The general public is also 
concerned about potential impacts on the standard of living, increased costs (especially 
energy/electricity) and decreased household disposable incomes. 
1.4.3 Political concerns 
The socio-economic concerns translate into criticism of EU climate policy as a barrier to 
development for less prosperous member states. There is widespread agreement across the 
entire political spectrum in Poland (including the two biggest parties, Civic Platform and Law and 
Justice) not to be overly ambitious in terms of climate policies (Skjaerseth, 2014). Significant 
industrial stakeholders that see ambitious climate action as an existential problem have an 
important voice and this reinforces the above-mentioned concerns at a political level. 
1.5 Conclusion on the socio-economic and environmental evolutions in Poland 
Poland’s transition to a market economy since 1989 has had as a co-benefit a sharp reduction of 
GHG emissions; however, there is nothing that guarantees a further and more sustainable 
transition towards a low-GHG economy. A critical element in the make-up of Poland’s emissions 
is the dominance of the power sector and its extraordinary dependence on coal. About 84% of 
grid electricity in Poland is generated from coal and lignite, the highest share in the EU, which 
makes Poland an outlier both in Europe and globally.  
The Polish economy, despite advances in several manufacturing industries, remains very energy 
intensive, mainly due to transportation and infrastructure (e.g. old age of the average coal-fired 
power plant, discussed below). Poland ranks seventh from the bottom among EU member 
states in terms of energy intensity. But the country is on its way to reach both its GHG and 
renewable energy targets within the context of the EU’s 2020 targets, and has accepted the EU’s 
proposed 40% target by 2030.  
This shows that, despite serious socio-economic and political concerns in the country, a 
transition towards a low-GHG economy has been initiated. Largely driven by EU climate and 
energy policies, key sectors of the Polish economy will increasingly have to contribute to this 
transition. Measures to mitigate the potential negative socio-economic impacts of those policies 
are necessary and will need to be carefully crafted to fit the needs of both the environment, the 
economy and society at large. 
2 Climate change mitigation policies 
As mentioned above, the project methodology sets boundaries as a recognition of the limited 
scope of this case study. The first boundary was set through the selection of the two sectors that 
constitute the focus of the case study: electricity generation and iron & steel. 
The second boundary relates to the selection of policies that impact each sector. For practical 
reasons and to keep the empirical evidence to a manageable size, this case study focuses on 
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European and Polish climate policies that have had the most significant impact on each of the 
two selected sectors (electricity generation and iron & steel).  
This case study identifies the EU emissions trading system and renewable support policies 
(notably the domestic green certificate scheme that helps Poland to achieve its RE target set by 
the EU) as the climate change policies that have had the largest impacts on the two sectors. 
Some of the other policies, including e.g. the Industrial Emissions Directive (IED) or the Mercury 
Convention also potentially have some (future) impacts on the selected sectors, but due to the 
limited scope of this case study, we leave them out of the analysis. 
The sections below present the most important policies on the international, European and 
national level. We list those policies that are agreed upon at international level and impact a 
wide range of jurisdictions, as  internationalpolicies. We then list European policies separately 
from national and international policies as Poland, as part of the EU, has to follow EU legislation 
and transpose the necessary laws into its own national legislation. 
 
Only those policies and programmes that have the most significant impact on each of the two 
selected sectors (electricity generation and iron & steel) are described here in detail. Other 
climate change policies that are listed here, are described in Annex I. 
2.1 International policies 
1. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), is the 
umbrella agreement of the global climate regime with near-universal membership 
aiming at stabilisation of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere. 
2. Kyoto Protocol established binding targets for Annex I Parties to the Convention 
(developed countries), while Non-Annex I Parties (developing countries) did not have to 
take on any reduction obligations. Collective emissions reductions for the EU amounted 
to 8% below 1990 levels in the first commitment period (2008-2012). 
3. The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer aims to reduce 
consumption of ozone-depleting substances so as to protect the ozone layer. Poland 
ratified the Montreal Protocol in 1990.  
4. The 1979 Geneva Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP) tackles 
air pollution (SO2 and other pollutants) on a transnational (regional) basis.  
5. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) agreed to establish a global market-
based mechanism (MBM) so as to address the GHG emissions of the international 
aviation sector. The mechanism should be developed by 2016 and it should enter into 
force by 2020.  
6. In the International Maritime Organization (IMO), a global market-based measure 
(MBM) to mitigate GHG emissions is under discussion. MBMs under consideration 
include an offsetting fund financed by a tax on bunker fuels, an energy-efficiency 
crediting and trading scheme and a global ETS for international shipping.  
7. The Minamata Convention on Mercury agreement is indirectly related to climate 
change, as coal, burned around the world to generate electricity, also emits mercury. 
(UNEP, 2013, p. ii). Poland has signed but not yet ratified the Convention. 
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2.2 EU policies 
1. The EU emissions trading system (EU ETS), Europe’s flagship climate policy, was adopted 
under Directive 2003/87/EC and covers more than 11,000 energy-intensive installations 
or more than 45% of total GHG emissions in the EU. The EU ETS is a cap-and-trade 
system first implemented in 2005, with the goal of providing a cost-effective tool to 
reach the greenhouse gas (GHG) targets that the EU has committed to. The European 
Union has set an EU-wide target to cut emissions from sectors covered by the EU ETS by 
21% by 2020 compared to 2005 levels.  
 
In its Article 10a, the ETS Directive addresses the concern of carbon leakage. Those 
sectors or sub-sectors that are at risk of carbon leakage receive a higher share of free 
allowances since they face competition from industries in third countries that are not 
subject to similar restrictions on GHG emissions. One of the sectors this case study 
concentrates on, the iron & steel sector, has been placed on the list of sectors and 
subsectors that are deemed to be exposed to a significant deemed risk of carbon 
leakage (European Commission, 2009d).  
 
2. The Renewable Energy Directive establishes a policy for the production and promotion 
of energy from renewable sources in the EU. The EU-wide objective is to fulfil at least 
20% of total EU energy needs with renewables by 2020. This target is split into individual 
national targets, ranging from 10% (Malta) to 49% (Sweden). Poland has a target of 15%. 
Each EU member state also has the obligation to reach a 10% share of renewables in 
transport (through biofuels). 
 
3. The Industrial Emissions Directive (IED) deals with pollution from various industrial 
sources such as , “emissions to air, water and land, generation of waste, use of raw 
materials,” (European Commission, 2015d). Operators of more than 50,000 industrial 
installations are required to hold an integrated permit issued by national authorities. 
The IED is based on five principles, namely 1) an integrated approach, 2) best available 
techniques (BAT), 3) flexibility, 4) inspections and 5) public participation. 
In addition, other climate change-related EU policies include the following (see Annex I): 
4. Effort Sharing Decision (ESD) 
5. CCS Directive 
6. Energy Efficiency Directive 
7. Energy Performance of Buildings Directive 
8. Fuel Quality Directive 
9. Car Standard Regulations 
10. F-gas Regulation 
2.3 National policies 
In general, climate policies fall under the larger umbrella of Polish development policy, which 
includes a National Development Strategy 2020, long- and medium-term development 
strategies and nine more specific Integrated Strategies on topics such as regional development, 
energy security and environment, whose aim is to assist in achieving the development 
objectives. Low-carbon development and green growth are also mentioned in the Medium-Term 
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National Development Strategy to 2020, and the Long-Term National Development Strategy 
2030, two of Poland’s most important strategic national development documents. 
 
The following national policies and programmes are the most significant for this case study. 
 
1. The 2010 National Renewable Energy Action Plan was adopted pursuant to the EU’s 
2009 RES Directive and, with reference to the Energy Policy of Poland, sets out a 
path for Poland to achieve its 2020 RE target, i.e. to increase the share of renewable 
energy of its total annual energy consumption to 15%. The most important scheme 
is a quota system whereby entities must have a certain amount of certificates of 
origin in their portfolio. There are several varieties of certificates, but the most 
important ones are the green certificates, representing energy generated from 
renewables.  
 
In 2015, a new Renewable Energy Act was adopted, which transposes EU Directive 
2009/28/EC on renewable energy into Polish legislation. Overall, the new act will 
reduce state support for renewables, from an estimated PLN 8.9 billion by 2020 
based on the old system, down to PLN 4.26 billion under the new system during the 
same period (Schonherr, 2015). In contrast, the act foresees that the bulk of small-
sized renewable power plants will benefit from feed-in tariffs, including at least 
200,000 prosumers (those that both produce and consume energy; see chapter 4 
for additional details).  
 
In addition, the following climate change-related national programmes are significant for this 
case study. 
 
2. The Thermo-modernization Fund, in place since 1998, constitutes the largest 
mechanism for energy efficiency financing in the building and construction sector 
(Rekiel, 2014). 
 
3. Poland’s Green Investment Scheme (GIS), operated by the National Fund for 
Environmental Protection and Water Management, links the sale of Assigned 
Amount Units (AAUs) under the Kyoto Protocol’s International Emissions Trading 
instrument, to the development of ‘green’ projects in Poland.   
 
Other national policies, legislations and development programmes can be identified (see Annex 
I): 
 
4. 2003 Poland Climate Policy 
5. Polish Strategic Plan for Adaptation to Climate Change (SPA2020) with the perspective 
by 2030 
6. National targets on EE, biofuels (included in the various EU directives) 
7. Energy Policy of Poland until 2030 
8. The Act of 15 April 2011 on Energy Efficiency 
9. The Act of 25 August 2006 on Bio-components and Liquid Biofuels & The Long-term 
Program to Promote Biofuels or Other Renewable Fuels for 2008–2014 
10. Operational Programme Infrastructure and Environment for the years 2007-2013 / 
2014-2020 
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11. Transport Development Strategy for 2020 (with the prospect of 2030) 
2.3.1 Are impacts of climate change policies monitored? 
At the national level, every single piece of legislation (on all levels – international, EU, national) 
must in principle undergo an impact assessment procedure, which includes impacts on the state 
budget, the economy, social costs, including the labour market, and the environment. In case of 
international conventions to be adopted by Poland, the necessary changes in national legislation 
and its potential impacts are taken into consideration before taking the decision authorising 
Polish representatives to begin a negotiating process. 
 
The assessment process (of new legislation or policy) includes wide consultations with 
interested parties, including individuals, civil society and business organisations. They may use 
online tools foreseen for that purpose. Every strategic document, including policies, need to 
undergo a strategic Environmental Impact Assessment.  
 
Even though the National Database by KOBiZE collects data on GHG emissions (KOBiZE, 2015), a 
direct and comprehensive monitoring of the impacts resulting from the implementation of 
policies and measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions is not carried out in Poland. The data 
collected are mostly used to identify the emissions for certain activities and processes, inter alia, 
for the purposes of reporting to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
the EU’s greenhouse gas monitoring mechanism, the ETS scheme and other schemes.  
 
Monitoring however does cover those measures that have been financed with public resources 
or EU funds. Monitoring of air pollution, for example, as well as the reporting system covering 
emissions other than of GHGs help to understand the impacts of implemented policies and 
measures. Additionally, all projects (both public and private) supported by the National Fund 
have to report on the environmental benefits, including emissions reductions, energy savings, 
etc. These data presented against the cost are a good illustration of investment efficiency. 
2.4 Conclusion on climate change policies 
This case study identified the EU emissions trading system and renewable support policies as 
those climate change policies that are of crucial relevance for the electricity and iron & steel 
sectors in Poland. The impact analysis in the next chapter will be limited to this smaller selection 
of policies.Un 
 
The next chapter will analyse the socio-economic and environmental evolutions within both the 
electricity generation and iron & steel sectors, and identify the (potential) negative and positive 
impacts that are attributable to the EU ETS and RES policies in Poland. 
  
 12 
3 Impacts of climate change mitigation policies 
This chapter analyses the positive and negative, economic, social and environmental impacts of 
climate change policies in Poland’s electricity generation and iron & steel sectors. We observed 
positive and negative impacts, which can be intended or unintended.  
 
As mentioned previously, this case study sets its scope by defining two boundaries, i.e. through 
the selection of relevant sectors (the electricity sector and the steel and iron sector) and the 
selection of key climate policies that have the greatest impact on those sectors (EU ETS and RES 
policies). 
 
This chapter consists of two parts. In the first part, we examine the electricity sector, and in the 
second part we look at the iron & steel sector.  
 
In each part, we describe the sector and then analyse the impacts of the key climate policies on 
the following areas: 
1. Economic impacts 
 costs (direct and indirect) 
 trade 
 investments 
 production and capacity 
 prices 
2. Social impacts 
 employment 
 affordability of energy for households  
3. Environmental impacts 
 GHG emissions 
3.1 Impacts in the electricity generation sector 
3.1.1 Sector description 
Some 84% of Poland’s electricity sector is based on coal (hard coal and lignite). Lignite accounts 
for around 35% of yearly electricity generation in Poland. It is important to note here that lignite 
is more GHG-intensive than hard coal. The CO₂-intensity of hard coal is 94.6 tonne CO₂ per 
terajoule (TJ), while lignite emits on average 101.2 tonne CO₂/TJ (Ecofys, 2014, p. 14). 
Another specificity is a heavy reliance on combined heat and power (CHP) plants. Poland is one 
of the few countries in the world relying to such an extent on the combined production of 
electricity and heat. About a third of all thermal power plants in Poland are CHP plants (IEA, 
2011: 62). 
The sector faces a number of important challenges in the years ahead, one of which is the scale 
of investments required to replace Poland’s rapidly aging generation capacity, with nearly half of 
today’s installations older than 30 years. Electricity networks are also ageing and require similar 
investments (IEA, 2011, p. 11).  
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Poland has announced that it will continue to rely on coal as its most important source of 
electricity generation, but its relative share will gradually decline (see Energy Policy of Poland, 
2009), while the options to upscale other sources of electricity, such as wind power, biomass 
and nuclear are actively being explored. There are various reasons for these developments, 
including the fact that economically recoverable hard coal and lignite reserves in established 
mines in Poland are declining very fast. Production is likely to decrease considerably by 2030, 
and, since the late 2000s, Poland is already increasingly relying on imported hard coal in 
addition to domestic production (see below; see also IEA, 2011, p. 11).  
Still, all official projections show the continuation of a very large proportion of coal-based 
electricity generation in the Polish energy mix, despite related GHG emissions and climate 
change concerns. 
In the early 1990s, a process of commercialisation, decentralisation and privatisation resulted in 
the unbundling of the sector into three sub-sectors, i.e. generation, transmission and 
distribution. Power plants started to operate as individual companies, selling all their production 
via Power Purchase Agreements to the Polish Power Grid Company, which then resold the 
electricity to a number of distribution companies. In the 2000s, the government decided to 
gradually consolidate the sector, leading to the establishment of four major players, – PGE, 
Tauron, ENERGA and ENEA – which together control the bulk of the Polish electricity market (for 
more details, see Kaminsky, 2012, pp. 138-139).  
In this case study, we focus the analysis on the 74 installations that we identified in the EU ETS 
registry as being electricity providers to the Polish grid. These plants include public CHP plants2 
and public power plants, but exclude power installations that generate electricity immediately 
at industrial plants. 
3.1.2 Economic impacts 
Cost impacts of climate policies 
This section looks at the cost impact of two different climate policies: a) EU ETS and b) RES 
policies. In the electricity sector, we look at the direct costs that these policies generate.3 While 
some of these cost impacts are intended consequences of EU ETS and RES policies, they have 
impacts which are unintended. 
A) EU Emissions Trading System – Direct costs 
As mentioned in chapter 2, the EU ETS is a cap-and-trade system first implemented in 2005, with 
the goal of providing a cost-effective tool to reach the greenhouse gas (GHG) targets to which 
the EU has committed itself. EU ETS compliance is set at the installation level. Each year, each 
installation must surrender a number of emission permits equal to its emissions during the past 
                                                          
2 No data are available to differentiate between emissions that result in electricity generation and heat 
generation inside combined heat and power plants. For this reason, we have included all CHP installations 
in their entirety in the scope of this study.  
3 As discussed below, these direct costs translate into indirect costs for other sectors. Possible 
administrative costs are not discussed in this study. 
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year. The compliance units are European Union Allowances (EUA), which represent one tonne of 
CO₂-equivalent emissions. The total cap is equal to the total sum of EUAs made available each 
year through free allocation or auctioning. Underneath that cap, market participants, including 
covered installations, are free to trade. 
The EU ETS is now in its third phase (2013-20). Given their different characteristics, the three 
phases have different cost impacts for the participating installations. We will focus on Phases 2 
(2008-12) and 3 (2013-20), and exclude the pilot phase (Phase I, 2005-07) as an 
acknowledgement of the limited scope of this study. 
In phase 2 (2008-12), free allocations were granted on the basis of the reported emissions in the 
pilot phase. However, the 2008-09 economic crisis had a clear impact and substantially 
decreased emissions in Phase 2. This contributed to the build-up of a surplus of allowances, 
estimated by the European Commission to be around 1.5 to 2 billion EUAs at the end of phase 2 
(European Commission, 2012a; for a more detailed explanation of the system of free allocation, 
see chapter 4 on the mitigation of impacts). 
Phase 3 (2013-20) saw a number of significant changes. Since 2013, auctioning has increased, 
and more than 40% of all allowances will be auctioned. Central to this part of the study is the 
fact that the power sector has in principle moved to full auctioning. However, in certain 
countries (including Poland) transitional free allocation is granted to the sector. It is important 
to note that transitional allocation will decrease progressively towards 2020 (European 
Commission, 2012c).  
This study analyses the cost impact of the EU ETS over the period 2008-14 (i.e. Phase 2 and the 
first two years of Phase 3). The following methodology is used to calculate the direct costs of the 
EU ETS in the electricity-generation sector in Poland: 
𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝐸𝑈 𝐸𝑇𝑆 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡  (
€
𝑀𝑊ℎ
)
=
[𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 (𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑂2) − 𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 (𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑂2)] ∗ 𝐶𝑂2 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒(
€
𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑂2
)
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝑀𝑊ℎ) 
 
Where: 
 Emissions are the verified emissions of the installation (EUTL, 2015 and KOBiZE, 
2015) 
 Allocations are the EUAs freely allocated to each installation (EUTL, 2015 and KOBiZE, 
2015) 
 CO₂ price is the average yearly market price of EUAs (European Energy Exchange, 
2015). 
 Production is the estimated production of electricity per MWh from public power 
plants and from public combined heat and power plants (KOBiZE, 2015). 
Essentially, the cost of compliance per MWh of produced electricity is the difference between 
the amount of EUAs each installation needs to surrender and the number of allowances 
allocated, multiplied by the cost of the allowances purchased and divided by production. 
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o EU ETS direct cost: Results 
 
First, Figure 6 demonstrates that the electricity sector has not been over-allocated throughout 
the 2008-14 period, except for the year 2012 (the dark bars show the amounts of free 
allocation). 
Figure 6. Free allocations and verified emissions in the electricity sector, 2008-14 (hard coal and 
lignite) 
 
Data sources: EUTL (2015) and KOBiZE (2015). 
Second, as discussed above, we know that there is a difference in the carbon intensity of hard 
coal and lignite, it is interesting to differentiate between those two fuel sources in our analysis. 
Table 2 therefore shows the emissions, allocations and the difference between emissions and 
allocations for hard coal-fired plants and lignite-fired plants. 
Table 2. Emissions and free allocation in electricity sector 2008-14, hard coal and lignite (in 
millions) 
Authors’ elaboration on data from: EUTL (2015) and KOBiZE (2015). 
This shows in more detail that the sector was not over-allocated (except hard coal-fired plants in 
2012), and that the share of emissions short in allowances has increased significantly for lignite-
fired plants as of phase 3 of the EU ETS (2013-14). 
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Hard coal 
 
Emissions 
 
87.2 
 
84.5 
 
90.1 
 
88.3 
 
81.9 
 
82.0 
 
75.0 
 
Allocations 
 
83.2 
 
83.4 
 
85.6 
 
85.9 
 
86.1 
 
50.7 
 
36.3 
 
Difference 4.0 1.1 4.5 2.5 -4.2 3.1 3.9 
Lignite 
Emissions 
 
55.9 
 
52.1 
 
50.3 
 
54.0 
 
56.0 
 
57.8 
 
55.1 
 
Allocations 
 
49.8 
 
49.8 
 
49.8 
 
49.8 
 
54.6 
 
25.4 
 
6.5 
 
Difference 
 
6.1 
 
2.4 
 
0.5 
 
4.2 
 
1.4 
 
32.3 
 
48.5 
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Third, the next step is to apply the formula described above, using the average EUA prices as 
listed in Table 3, and production figures we obtained from Kobize (2015). 
Table 3. EUA prices in the EU ETS, 2008-14 (€) 
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
EUA price  23.03 13.31 14.48 13.77 7.56 4.50 5.92 
Authors’ elaboration on data from: European Energy Exchange (2015). 
This then results in the direct costs stemming from the EU ETS as a climate change policy 
mitigation to the Polish electricity sector. 
Table 4. Direct costs for hard coal and lignite power plants (€/MWh) 
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Hard coal 
Direct costs 
 
€1.08 
 
€0.18 
 
€0.73 
 
€0.37 
 
-€0.38 
 
€1.66 
 
€2.86 
Lignite 
Direct costs 
 
€2.64 
 
€0.63 
 
€0.17 
 
€1.08 
 
€0.18 
 
€2.56 
 
€5.31 
Authors’ elaboration on data from: EUTL (2015) and KOBiZE (2015). 
 
Table 4 shows that direct costs are small but non-trivial, ranging from -€0.38 to €5.31 per MWh.  
However, other studies on the impacts of the EU ETS on the European power sector overall have 
shown that the power sector has actually gained substantial windfall profits from the EU ETS. As 
shown in the tables above, electricity installations receive most of the EU ETS allowances that 
they need for free. However, they then still pass on the value of these free allowances to 
electricity consumers by raising the price of electricity. Pass-through rates in the power sector 
have been estimated to go up to 100% (see e.g. Egenhofer et al., 2011; Sijm et al., 2006). 
While there is limited data available to verify this dynamic in the case of Poland, it is 
nevertheless safe to assume that the EU ETS has most likely also created windfall profits for the 
Polish electricity sector. These windfall profits are likely to be far greater than the direct costs 
they incurred. In other words, the flanking measure put in place to mitigate the negative 
impacts (i.e. free allocation), has overachieved its aim, certainly in the 2008-12 period. 
Turning to the future, an important observation is that in phase 3, installations have faced a 
higher direct cost than in phase 2. As transitional free allocation is set to progressively decrease 
towards 2020, these direct costs will increase even further, while windfall profits are likely to 
decrease. Being part of the policy design of EU ETS, the increase of direct costs due to EU ETS is 
an intended impact of this climate change policy. 
B) Renewable energy support (RES) policies 
As discussed in chapter 2, under the EU Renewable Energy Directive, Poland needs to increase 
its share of renewables to 15% by 2020 of gross final energy consumption. The RES Directive has 
been partly transposed in Poland’s National Renewable Energy Action Plan (2010), and more 
recently in the 2015 Renewable Energy Act. The following policies and subsidies are in place to 
encourage investment and production of renewable energy (KPMG, 2013): 
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 Tax exemptions; 
 In some cases solar photovoltaic modules cannot be subject to real estate tax as other 
constructions; 
 Agriculture taxpayers may claim a refund of investment costs if the investment relates 
to renewable energy (up to 25%); 
 Subsidies and grants from the EU or domestic institutions (for example, the National 
Fund of Environmental Protection and Water Management); and 
 Support schemes (including green certificates) for solar, wind, geothermal, hydro, 
biomaterial and offshore technologies. 
 
In this section, the focus is on the system of green certificates. Under this system, producers of 
renewable electricity are given a certificate for each MWh of green electricity they produce 
(including from wind, co-fired biomass or other types of renewables). As shown in Table 6, these 
tradeable green certificates had in 2008-14 a market value between €39.70 and €67.53.  
Table 6. Yearly average price of green certificates, 2008-14 (€/MWh)4 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
PLN 240.79 267.1 274.39 281.3933 251.2092 165.4025 184.2825 
Euro 57.79 64.10 65.85 67.53 60.29 39.70 44.23 
Authors’ elaboration on data from: KOBiZE (2015), POLPX Monthly Report 2010 – 2014. 
Overall, electricity distributors have a legal obligation to buy an amount of green certificates 
corresponding to a yearly set quota. If this obligation is not fulfilled, the electricity distributor 
has to pay a substitution fee which is a price established yearly by the Energy Regulatory Office. 
As shown in Figure 7, this price has steadily increased from 2008 (€59.63) to 2014 (€72.01), 
while certificate prices have decreased since 2011. 
This price differential is due to issues such as increased production of electricity by renewable 
sources (most notably from co-fired biomass in thermal power plants, but also some wind and 
solar power) which has led to an oversupply of green certificates in the market, creating a 
downward pressure on certificate prices (Polish Wind Association, 2015). 
  
                                                          
4 Weighted average index OZEX_A. Prices are converted to euros with an exchange rate of 1 PLN = 0.24 €. 
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Figure 7. Green certificate and substitution fee prices, 2008-14 (€/MWh) 
 
Authors’ elaboration on data from: KOBiZE (2015) and POLPX Monthly Report 2010 – 2014. 
Due to a lack of available data, a precise calculation of the cost impacts of the green certificate 
scheme falls outside the scope of this study. However, rough estimates can be deduced, simply 
by multiplying the price of the certificates with the renewable electricity production figures for a 
given year. For the year 2012, for example, the price of a green certificate was €60.29/MWh 
(and a somewhat higher substitution fee of €68.82/MWh). With a total production of 4,747,000 
MWh from renewable sources in Poland in 2012, the green certificate scheme has potentially 
resulted in benefits of up to €286 million in that year.  
The majority of these benefits go to biomass which is the single largest source of renewable 
electricity in Poland. This means that the system actually supports coal and lignite-fired thermal 
power plants, because these are the plants that use biomass co-firing to generate electricity 
(especially a number of older power plants use this technique). In that sense, the system does 
not really support a transformational shift away from thermal power.  
At the same time, the policy does promote and support the use of renewable energy sources, 
which in addition to biomass also includes a small but growing wind power sector. This intended 
impact is likely to be at the expense of coal and lignite as a fuel. 
Further, the costs of the system are borne by distributors, which pass through these costs in the 
price of electricity to consumers (households, industry or other users).  
It should be noted that renewables continue to represent a modest share of electricity 
generation in Poland. However, since Poland is aiming the produce 20% of its electricity with 
renewable energy by 2020, the impact of RES policies might grow in the near future, certainly 
when taking into account the forthcoming changes in Poland’s RE support systems. This includes 
the gradual introduction of a new, auctioning-based system as established in the 2015 
Renewable Energy Act, which also includes a provision to stimulate solar PV micro-installations 
(see also chapters 2 and 4). 
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Impacts on international trade 
International trade, exports and imports, is another important category of impacts. If we look at 
the recent trends in cross-border trade in electricity and coal in Poland, both seem to follow 
roughly similar trends in the period 2000-13, certainly with regard to imports: both coal and 
electricity imports were low in the early 2000s and gradually increased later on. Exports, 
especially of coal and lignite, were very high at the beginning of the decade and decreased 
somewhat in later years (26,945,000 tonnes of coal and lignite exports as of 2000; down to 
18,035,000 tonnes as of 2013). 
The current and expected costs associated with the EU ETS and RES policies may have a negative 
intended impact on the export of coal and lignite and electricity, but it is difficult to establish a 
precise cause-and-effect relationship.  
In terms of climate change policies, changes in free allocation rules for electricity sector in phase 
three of the EU ETS indicate that the sector might experience a direct cost from the EU ETS in 
the future. RES policies, in addition, are already having intended cost impacts on the sector.  
  
Summary: Cost impacts from the EU ETS and RES policies on the Polish iron and steel sector 
 
 1/ EU ETS 
 Data indicate small but non-trivial direct costs to the electricity sector in the period 2008-
14.  
 However, due to high levels of free allocation and a very high pass-through rate, the EU ETS 
has likely resulted in substantial windfall profits for the sector. 
 Since transitional free allocation is set to progressively decrease towards 2020, the direct 
costs will increase, while windfall profits are likely to decrease. 
 
 2/ RES policies 
 RES policies, and the green certificates system in particular, are likely to result in a positive 
impact on the producers of renewable electricity in Poland. 
 There are costs for the electricity distributors, which are passed on to the consumers of 
electricity. 
 RES policies, and especially the green certificates system, promote and support the use of 
renewable electricity sources. This is likely to be at the expense of coal and lignite as a fuel. 
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Figure 8. Electricity imports    Figure 9. Coal and lignite imports and 
export and exports, 2000-13 (MWh)   2000-13 (thousands of tonnes) 
               
Data sources: Agencja Rynku Energii (Energy Market Agency, Poland) and Eurostat (2015). 
 
Cross-border electricity trade volumes are fairly small, due to limited capacity at the 
interconnections with neighbouring countries. Additional lines or network reinforcements to 
expand interconnection capacity are being constructed or planned (IEA, 2011, p. 73). 
Impacts on investments 
Investments in the electricity sector are slowly increasing, as measured over the 2008-13 period 
(see Figure 10), from €3.8 billion to €4.6 billion annually. This figure gives an indication as to 
what is spent at present to refurbish and invest in power plants in Poland. In view of the 
combined challenges of energy security, the advanced age of the average coal-fired plant in 
Poland and the need to tackle climate change and environmental pollution, the International 
Energy Agency expects “massive investments in the short and medium term” (IEA, 2011, p. 11) 
in the Polish electricity sector.      
Figure 10. Investments in electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply in Poland (2008-
2013) 
 
Source: KOBiZE (2015). 
It is safe to assume that so far the EU ETS has not significantly incentivised investment into 
refurbishment and modernisation of power plants since the sector has not experienced any 
major cost impacts from the system. The green certificate system and other Polish RES policies, 
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as is intended, in contrast, are much more likely to have incentivised investments, particularly in 
the field of renewable technologies (including biomass and wind power).  
Impacts on production and capacity 
In terms of impacts on production and capacity, we see a modest increase in installed capacity 
of renewables (including biomass), from nearly 4MW installed capacity in the year 2000, to 3429 
MW in 2013 (see Table 8). Production figures have increased from 5 GWh to 6004 GWh of green 
electricity during this same period (2000-13). This remains tiny compared to 30,027 MW of 
installed thermal power capacity, but the intended positive impact of Poland’s green certificate 
scheme and other RES policies on production is nevertheless very clear. In contrast, we do not 
observe any significant impact of the EU ETS on production figures at present. 
The conclusion is that the green certificate scheme has had a positive impact on renewables 
energy production. The increase in production has been moderate but significant.  
Table 8. Production (GWh) and installed capacity (MW) of electricity in Poland (2000-13) 
  2000 2005 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Thermal 
power 
plants 
Production 
(GWh) 
141 
063 
153 
023 
151 
721 
147 
669 
152 
505 
157 
582 
154 
926 
155 
555 
Installed 
capacity (MW) 
28 372 29 815 29 816 29 985 29 908 30 405 30 365 30 027 
Hydropower 
(incl 
pumped 
storage) 
Production 
(GWh) 
4 116 3 778 2 747 2 974 3 488 2 761 2 465 2 997 
Installed 
capacity (MW) 
2 183 2 321 2 335 2 338 2 342 2 346 2 351 2 355 
Renewables 
(including 
biomass) 
 
Production 
(GWh) 
5 135 837 1 077 1 664 3 205 4 747 6 004 
Installed 
capacity (MW) 
4 121 526 709 1 108 1 800 2 564 3 429 
Total  Production 
(GWh) 
145 
184 
156 
936 
155 
305 
151 
720 
157 
657 
163 
548 
162 
138 
164 
556 
Installed 
capacity 
(MW) 
30 559 32 257 32 677 33 032 33 358 34 551 35 280 32 382 
Data source: Eurostat (2015). 
Impacts on prices 
Climate change policies are likely to have generated an impact on electricity prices. Due to the 
pass-through of costs resulting from the EU ETS as well as RES policies, it is very likely that 
electricity prices have increased. Of course, electricity price development consists of many 
different components and the observed trend is not only the result of climate change policies, 
but is also due to several other factors such as high investment costs related to the 
modernisation of old installations.  
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While it is beyond the scope of this study to assess the precise impact attributable to climate 
policies, it is nevertheless useful to look at the general trend of electricity prices in Poland. 
Household electricity rates in €/kWh went up considerably between 2000 and 2014, from 8.1 
cent in 2000 to 14.1 cent in 2014. Electricity rates for industry, meanwhile, have also gone up, 
and in fact nearly doubled (although starting from a lower base). In 2000, industrial electricity 
were at 5.4 cent, and went up to 10.2 cent in 2014 (see Figures 11 and 12).  
Figure 11. Household electricity rates, 2000-14   Figure 12. Industry electricity rates 
(€/kWh)       2000-14 (€/kWh)
              
Data source: Eurostat (2015). 
3.1.3 Social impacts 
Impacts on employment 
In addition to economic impacts, another important category of impacts are social impacts, 
most importantly impacts on employment. Figures in both the electricity sector and coal mines 
show a slightly negative trend in recent years.  
Figure 13. Employment in Polish electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply, 2005-13 
 
Data sources: Eurostat (2015) and Statistical Yearbook of Industry – Poland, Central Statistical Office 
(2014). 
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Figure 14. Employment in Polish coal and lignite mines, 2005-13) 
 
Data sources: Eurostat (2015) and Statistical Yearbook of Industry – Poland, Central Statistical Office 
(2014). 
It is unlikely that the EU ETS, which most likely resulted in windfall profits for coal and lignite-
fired plants, is linked to decreasing employment figures. RES policies, however, could have a 
positive impact on employment in electricity generation with renewable energy (e.g. wind 
power), while potentially negatively impacting employment in coal and lignite mines. 
It should also be noted here that a massive decrease in the number of employees in coal and 
lignite mines took place in the 1990s, with over 450,000 miners in 1990 and less than 200,000 by 
the year 2000 (IEA, 2011, p. 81). This took place as a result of the initial socio-economic 
transition in the 1990s and is not related to the EU ETS or recent RES policies.  
Impacts on affordability of energy for households 
In addition, potential increases in electricity prices have a social dimension. The price rises which 
are a likely consequence of the pass-through of costs of climate change policies into electricity 
prices, might result in households spending more money on their energy bills.  
 In Poland, the share of energy expenditure within total household expenditure has grown 
between 2000 and 2010 suggesting that energy affordability has for long been a challenge in 
Poland despite to economic growth the country has enjoyed in the 2000s (S Bouzarovski, 2011). 
Reasons beyond climate change policies, such as poor insulation in housing and the previously 
record-low energy prices dating from the time before transition to market economy, have also 
impacted the rise of energy consumption and electricity prices (S. Bouzarovski et al., 2013) 
Electricity producers passing through the costs of climate change policies into electricity prices 
might partly decrease affordability of energy in Poland for the vulnerable groups of society.  
3.1.4 Environmental impacts 
GHG emissions 
We are aware that many international, EU-level and national policies (e.g. the EU’s Industrial 
Emissions Directive, IED) are impacting the environmental performance of the electricity sector, 
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but in order to limit the scope of this study, we concentrate the analysis on the effects of the EU 
ETS and RES policies on GHG emissions.  
Figure 15. Verified CO₂ emissions in electricity generation, 2008-14 (thousands of tonnes) 
 
Data sources: Based on EUTL (2015) and KOBiZE (2015). 
 
As can be seen in Figure 15, GHG emissions from electricity sector have moderately decreased 
between 2008 and 2014. There are of course multiple factors that affect the overall decreasing 
trend in GHG emissions, one of which is undoubtedly the 2008-09 economic and financial crisis. 
A previous study for example has shown that 3.35% rise in emission-intensity improvements 
could be attributed to EU ETS in 2007-08 (Egenhofer et al., 2011). Also other studies at the 
European level have demonstrated that at least part of the reductions are attributable to 
climate and energy policies, and notably the EU ETS (e.g. Laing et al., 2013). 
It can be inferred that the EU ETS and RES policies combined, have likely contributed to the 
observed moderate decrease of Poland’s GHG emissions in the power sector. 
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3.2 Impacts in the iron & steel sector 
3.2.1 Sector description 
The iron & steel sector has gone through a transformation with Poland moving from a centrally 
planned economy to market economy, to an even larger extent than the electricity sector. This 
process resulted in the privatisation and modernisation of the sector demonstrated by the 
change in the role of the Polish state. In 1990, the sector was dominated by state-owned 
companies, whereas today the biggest players are multinationals. ArcelorMittal, the world’s 
Summary: Impacts of climate policies (EU ETS and RES policies) on the Polish electricity sector 
Economic impacts 
 Costs: The EU ETS and RES policies combined result in small but non-trivial costs for power 
installations and distributors. Most (even 100%) of these costs are passed through to 
electricity consumers.  
 Trade: The current and expected costs associated with the EU ETS and RES policies may 
have a negative impact on the export of coal and lignite and electricity, but it is difficult to 
establish a precise cause-and-effect relationship. 
 Investments: The EU ETS is not likely to have significantly encouraged investment in the 
refurbishment of power plants since the sector has been able to pass through the cost 
impacts from the system. The green certificate system and other Polish RES policies, in 
contrast, are likely to have encouraged investments in the field of renewable technologies. 
 Production & capacity: Poland’s green certificate scheme and other RES policies have 
clearly positively impacted production and capacity figures of renewable electricity 
(biomass, wind). In contrast, we do not observe any significant impact of the EU ETS at 
present. 
 Prices: The EU ETS and RES policies have very likely generated an increase in industrial 
electricity prices, due to a high cost pass-through rate. 
  
Social impacts 
 Employment: RES policies have likely had a positive impact on employment in electricity 
generation based on renewable sources, while potentially negatively impacting 
employment in coal and lignite mines. No impacts from the EU ETS can be inferred. 
Impacts on affordability of energy for households: The EU ETS and RES policies have very 
likely generated an increase in household electricity prices, due to a high cost pass-through 
rate. This can in turn result in higher share of household income spend on electricity bills, 
having an impact on affordability of energy. 
Environmental impacts 
 GHG emissions: The EU ETS and RES policies combined have likely contributed to the 
observed moderate decrease of Polish GHG emissions in the electricity sector. 
All in all, we observe fairly modest impacts from climate change policies. Increase in electricity 
prices for industry and households (economic and social impact) has been the most significant 
observed impact. 
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largest steel producer, has a market share of more than 65% (Gajdzik, 2013) and 70% of 
production capacity of steel in Poland (ArcelorMittal, 2015). 
Concentrated in southern Poland, the sector consists of 45 installations, the largest of them 
being ArcelorMittal’s facilities in Katowice and Kraków. In 2011, the industry’s share of total 
gross added value to the Polish economy stood at 2.4%. In 2008, Poland produced around 0.75% 
of total world production (1327 million tonnes) of crude steel (Pardo et al., 2012). 
The restructuring of the Polish economy resulted in a shift away from the very energy-intensive 
open hearth furnace (OHF) production process in the early 2000s. In the 1990s, 30% of Polish 
steel production still used the OHF method (Gajdzik, 2013). This resulted in the sector becoming 
considerably more energy efficient.  
At present, there are two main production models for steel, in Poland and elsewhere: 1) the 
integrated route (Basic Oxygen Furnace, BOF), which is based on removing impurities from raw 
iron and 2) the recycled route that uses recycled scrap iron (Electric Arc Furnace, EAF). Steel-
making via the integrated route requires iron-making. It is therefore appropriate to analyse steel 
and iron production as one sector.  
Both the integrated route and the recycling route use coal and coke as their main fuel which 
result in high levels of GHG emissions. The sector also uses electricity from the grid, around 84% 
of which in Poland is based on coal. In this case study, we look not only at installations 
producing iron & steel (pig iron, sinter plants, steel production and rolling mills) but also fuel 
combustion and industrial CHP used by the sector. This results in total of 45 installations. 
Central to this study is the fact that the recycled route uses around 80% less energy than the 
integrated route (European Commission, 2013). The European Commission has estimated that 
during the period 2005-08, the emissions intensity of the integrated route was on average 2.3 
tCO₂/t of rolled products and 0.21 tCO₂/t for the recycling route. This means that the integrated 
route is a considerably more emissions-intensive than the recycled route (European 
Commission, 2013). 
In 2013, a majority of steel in Poland, 59%, was produced with the integrated route while 41% 
relied on the recycling route (Polish Steel Association, 2015).  
Carbon leakage is frequently seen as the major negative environmental impact of climate 
change policies.  
3.2.2 Economic impacts 
Cost impacts of climate policies 
 A) EU Emissions Trading System – Direct costs 
As described in chapter 3.1, the EU ETS has seen some significant changes in its 3rd Phase. For 
the steel & iron sector, this has meant that in the phase 3 of EU ETS, the sector continues to 
receive part of its EUAs for free, but has to get the rest through auctions. The reason for 
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continuous free allocation for this sector stems from the perceived risk of carbon leakage for the 
iron & steel industry.5 
The methodology to calculate the direct costs for the iron & steel sector is analogous to the 
methodology described for the electricity sector above, and is based on the following formula: 
𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝐸𝑈 𝐸𝑇𝑆 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 (
€
𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑙
)
=
[𝐸𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 (𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑂2) − 𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 (𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒 𝑜𝑓𝐶𝑂2)] ∗ 𝐶𝑂2 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒(
€
𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑂2
)
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑙) 
 
 
In this formula, production for the iron & steel sector is the estimated crude steel production 
per tonne (data obtained from the Polish Steel Association; for an explanation of the other 
terms and data sources used, see the section on the electricity sector above). 
o Direct costs: Results 
Figure 16 shows that in phase 2 (2008-12) of the EU ETS, the iron & steel sector received all its 
allowances for free and was actually over-allocated. As of phase 3, the sector was short in free 
allowances, but still received a large proportion for free. 
Figure 16. ETS free allocation and emissions in Poland’s steel & iron sector, 2014-08 
 
Authors’ elaboration on data from: EUTL (2015) and KOBiZE (2015). 
A detailed break-down of the emissions, freely allocated allowances and the difference (a 
negative number represents an overallocation) shows that in the 2008-2012 period, between 
                                                          
5 European Commission, Decision determining, pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council, a list of sectors and subsectors which are deemed to be exposed to a 
significant risk of carbon leakage.  
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0.6 and 4.6 million allowances were overallocated to the sector per year. In 2013 and 2014, the 
sector was respectively short 1.0 and 1.3 million allowances.  
Table 9. Emissions and free allocation in iron & steel sector, 2008-14 (millions) 
Authors’ elaboration on data from: European Union Transaction Log (2015) and KOBiZE (2015). 
The next step is to calculate the direct costs by applying the formula presented above. If we 
calculate the hypothetical costs without free allocation, i.e. emissions multiplied by the EUA 
price and divided by production, we observe figures ranging between as high as €32.30 per 
tonne of steel in 2008 and as low as €6.76 in 2013 (Table 10). 
Actual direct costs with free allocations were negative between 2008 and 2012, with windfall 
profits ranging between €1.4 and €6.01 per tonne of steel. Small but non-trivial direct costs,a s 
an intended cost impact of EU ETS, are observed in 2013 and 2014. 
Table 10. Direct cost of EU ETS for iron & steel sector, 2008-14 (€/tonne of steel) with no pass-
through of costs 
Authors’ elaboration on data from: European Union Transaction Log (2015) and KOBiZE (2015). 
The observed changes in 2013-14 are due to EU ETS reforms in phase 3, where the iron & steel 
sector continues to receive part of its EUAs for free, but has to get the rest through auctions. For 
the whole sector, this has meant an estimated cost of €4,514,467.50 in 2013 and €7,799,428.32 
in 2014.6 
However, the direct cost impact is based on the assumption that in a competitive global market, 
the industry cannot pass on the cost to the steel consumers. Other studies show that this is not 
a reliable assumption and results in an over-estimation of the direct costs of the EU ETS 
(McKinsey, 2006; Vivid Economics, 2014; CE Delft, 2010). An impact assessment from the 
European Commission (2015) concludes that the iron & steel industry in Europe passes through 
                                                          
6 Essentially, the estimated cost for the whole sector is the difference between the amount of EUAs each 
installation needs to surrender and the number of allowances allocated, multiplied by price of CO₂.  
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
 
Emissions 
 
13.6 
 
9.6 
 
10.9 
 
11.5 
 
11.5 
 
12.0 
 
11.9 
 
Allocations 
 
14.2  
 
14.1  
 
14.2  
 
14.4  
 
14.4  
 
11.0 
 
10.6 
 
Difference 
 
-0.6 
-4.6  -3.3 -2.8 -2.9 1.0 1.3 
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
 
Without free allocations 
 
€32.30 
 
€17.95 
 
€19.71 
 
€18.00 
 
€10.34 
 
€6.76 
 
€8.23 
 
With free allocations 
 
-€1.40 
 
-€8.66 
 
-€6.01 
 
-€4.48 
 
-€2.64 
 
€0.56 
 
€0.91 
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a significant share of its direct EU ETS costs. This rate is estimated to be between 60% and 100% 
(European Commission, 2015a, pp. 193-202). 
There is no precise data available for the case of Poland, but based on these EU figures, it is 
reasonable to assume that while the Polish steel plants received most of their allowances for 
free, they still passed on the costs of these free allowances to consumers by raising the prices of 
steel, generating additional (and substantial) windfall profits.  
It is concluded that the sector has not experienced any major direct cost impacts from the EU 
ETS and is very likely to have actually benefited from significant windfall profits with over-
allocations and the potential benefits from pass-through of costs. 
There is nevertheless another way through which the sector can incur costs from the EU ETS, 
namely indirect costs from the use of electricity, as explained in the next section. 
  B) EU Emissions Trading System – Indirect costs 
Electric utilities face increased production costs through their ETS compliance cost. They pass on 
those costs to their respective customers, including to the iron & steel sector, via higher 
electricity rates. The iron & steel sector therefore faces an extra cost because of the cost of CO₂ 
embedded in electricity prices.  
The pass-through rate is a number that is contested and may vary significantly between member 
states. In the calculations presented below, the pass-through rate is assumed to be one (100%), 
but this is an assumption that may overestimate actual indirect costs. 
As electricity intensity of steel production is technology-specific, this study looks firstly at the 
indirect EU ETS impact in relation to the integrated route and secondly in relation to the 
recycled route.  
This study uses the following formula to estimate the indirect costs of EU ETS for both 
production processes in the iron & steel sector: 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝐸𝑈 𝐸𝑇𝑆 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 (
€
𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑙
)
= 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 (
𝑘𝑊ℎ
𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑙
)
∗ 𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 (
𝐶𝑂2
𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑙
)
∗ 𝐶𝑂2 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 (
€
𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑂2
) 
Where: 
 Electricity intensity of steel production: the amount of electricity used to produce 
one tonne of steel.7 This amount is plant and technology specific. Plant level data is 
not available and therefore technology-specific data is used;8 
                                                          
7 Only the electricity intensity of the crude steel production process is taken into account. 
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 Carbon intensity of electricity generation indicates the amount of tonnes of CO₂ 
emitted by utilities to generate one kWh; 9 and 
 CO₂ price is the average yearly market-price of EUAs (European Energy Exchange, 
2015).  
Essentially, the indirect cost per tonne of steel, is the electricity intensity of production (KWh of 
electricity needed to produce one tonne of steel) multiplied by carbon intensity of electricity. 
This is multiplied by the cost of the allowances purchased. 
o Indirect costs: Results 
Based on a range of electricity intensity figures,10 a lower and higher range of indirect costs are 
calculated, both for the BOF and EAF production processes (Tables 12 and 13). 
Table 12. Indirect cost per tonne of steel (€/tonne) in the BOF production process 
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
BOF €/tonne of steel lower range €0.20 €0.11 €0.12 €0.12 €0.06 €0.04 €0.05 
higher range €1.22 €0.70 €0.76 €0.73 €0.40 €0.24 €0.31 
Source: Author’s own calculations. 
 
Table 13. Indirect cost per tonne of steel (€/tonne) in the EAF production process 
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
EAF €/tonne of steel lower range €8.19 €4.73 €5.15 €4.90 €2.69 €1.60 €2.10 
higher range €15.16 €8.76 €9.53 €9.06 €4.98 €2.96 €3.90 
Source: Author’s own calculations. 
 
This shows that the steel and iron sector experienced an indirect costs from the EU ETS in 2008-
14. The downward trend in indirect costs reflects the downward trend in EUA prices throughout 
this period. The tables also show a fundamental difference in the indirect costs installation face 
between the two technologies. The indirect costs for BOF plants (which are less electricity 
intensive and rely on utilities for only 20% of their electricity needs) are relatively low, with 
figures between 0.73 and 0.04 Euros per tonne. EAF installations use electricity as their primary 
energy input and indirect costs have a far greater impact on their operations. The additional cost 
per ton of steel is between €1.6 and €15.16. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
8 Data provided by the European Commission’s Member States Best Available Techniques (BAT) Reference 
report for Iron and Steel Production. The report establishes a large range of energy inputs due to variety 
of energy management at different sites across Europe. These energy-intensity figures allows- us to carry 
out calculations which result in the establishment of a higher and a lower range of indirect costs of the EU 
ETS  per tonne of steel. For BOF: Input/output data from 21 existing basic oxygen steelmaking plants in 
different EU countries are used. For EAF: Input/output data for several electric arc furnaces within the EU. 
9 Communication from the Commission: Guidelines on certain State aid measures in the context of the 
greenhouse gas emission allowance trading scheme post-2012 (2012/C 158/04). 
10 See footnote 8 above. 
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It is concluded that the indirect EU ETS costs depend on the technology that is used. Indirect 
costs are considerably higher for EAF plants than for BOF plants. On the other hand, these pass-
through costs have decreased significantly during the period 2008-14, mainly as a result of 
decreased prices of allowances. 
C) Renewable energy support (RES) policies – indirect costs 
As discussed above, Poland has put in place a system of tradable green certificates. This system 
supports renewable energy production in Poland and obliges electricity distributors to buy 
either green certificates from renewable electricity producers or pay a substitution fee. In both 
cases, the cost is passed through to electricity prices, and therefore paid by the electricity 
consumer. The green certificate scheme therefore leads to an indirect cost for the iron & steel 
sector. 
A previous study has estimated the cost of renewable energy policies in Poland in ceramics, flat 
glass and chemical industries in 2010-12. This previous study (Egenhofer et al., 2013) is based on 
an investigation of five plants in Poland and looked at the electricity bills of these plants. It 
shows that the RES policies amounted to an indirect cost of around 6.9 €/MWh for Polish 
industry.   
Figure 17. Cost of RES levies in price of electricity for industry in Poland, 2010-12 
 
Source: Egenhofer et al. (2013). 
 
The green certificate system is (at the time of writing) the central RES support scheme in Poland. 
It is therefore reasonable to assume that the observed cost of €6.9/MWh for ’RES levies’ in 
industrial electricity bills is attributable to this system.  
It is also important to note that the green certificate scheme is likely to generate a bigger impact 
on those installations that produce steel with the more electricity-intensive EAF production 
process compared to the BOF production process. 
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Impacts on international trade 
We have not identified any major impacts of climate change policies to exports and imports of 
steel. 
Steel exports have actually slightly increased since the early 2000s, as shown in Figure 18. The 
Polish steel sector exported 4 million tonnes of steel in 2000 and in 2014 exports of the sector 
were 4.8 million tonnes. Imports were low in in 2000 (2 million tonnes) and gradually increased 
later on (in 2014, 9 million tonnes; see Agencja Rynku Energii; Eurostat, 2015). 
  
Summary: Cost impacts from the EU ETS and RES policies on the Polish iron & steel sector 
 
1/ EU ETS 
 Direct costs 
The sector has not experienced any major direct cost impacts from the EU ETS and is very 
likely to have actually benefited from significant windfall profits. 
 Indirect costs 
Some indirect costs are observed. These were considerably higher for EAF plants than for 
BOF plants.  
 
2/ RES policies 
 RES policies – indirect costs 
RES policies, and notably the green certificate scheme, generate an indirect cost to the iron 
and steel sector as a result of higher electricity prices. 
 
3/ Combined impacts 
 The net costs are hard to quantify because of the lack of precise data on the pass-through 
of costs. However, it is a reasonable assumption that the combined cost impacts of the EU 
ETS and RES policies have been relatively low. 
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Figure 18. Trade of steel (thousands of tonnes) 
 
Data sources: Agencja Rynku Energii and Eurostat (2015). 
The drop in exports in 2009-11 can likely be explained by the financial crisis in Europe which 
temporarily decreased demand of steel in sectors that consume steel elsewhere in the EU. 
(Polish Steel Industry, 2010). In 2012, exports again reached the level of 2008. Similarly, a drop 
in imports is likely explained by decreasing consumption of steel as demand for steel for 
example in the construction and automotive industry decreased during the period (Polish Steel 
Industry, 2012). 
Impacts on investments 
A cautious estimation can be made that so far the direct costs of the EU ETS have not to a large 
extent encouraged investment in the refurbishment and modernisation of the iron & steel 
sector since the sector has not – as yet – experienced any significant adverse direct cost impacts 
from the system.  
Cost impacts of climate change policies can also lead to carbon leakage resulting in investments 
being relocated away from Poland to countries with less-constraining GHG emissions policies in 
place. Since the cost impact of climate change policies has been low, this study does not identify 
any investments having been relocated away from Poland due to climate change policies. In 
other words, no carbon leakage on investments has been identified. 
The indirect cost from RES policies and the EU ETS, translated into the higher electricity bills in 
the iron & steel sector, might to some extent encourage investments in technology that uses 
less electricity.  
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Figure 19. Investment in iron & steel sector in Poland (millions of PLN) 
 
Source: Polish Steel Association. 
As seen in Figure 19, investments in the Polish steel & iron sector peaked in 2006-09. These 
investments are related to massive restructuring of the sector and to the completion of large-
scale investment projects. For example in 2005-06, Mittal had three large investment projects: a 
colour-coating line in Świętochłowice, a modernised wire rod mill in Sosnowiec and a continuous 
casting line in Dąbrowa Górnicza. In 2007, a hot strip mill in the plant in Kraków was activated 
(AlcelorMittal, 2015). Investments to the sector include also research and development 
expenditure to new technologies (Polish Steel Association, Annual reports 2005-2006). 
Impacts on production  
It is difficult to establish a link between climate policies and production figures. There are 
several factors that can have an impact on crude steel production, for example the privatisation 
and modernisation process in the Polish industry, changes in global steel production, and 
developments in domestic and international demand of steel. Climate policies such as the EU 
ETS or the green certificate system may also play a role, but there is a lack of available data to 
establish a cause-and-effect relationship. 
Production figures in the steel & iron sector range from 11.6 million tonnes in 1997 to 7.1 
million tonnes in 2009. Since the decrease in production in 2009, most likely due to the 
economic crisis, the production level has picked up again. In 2014, the Polish steel industry 
produced 8.6 million tonnes of crude steel.  
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Figure 20. Production of crude steel (thousands of tonnes) 
 
Data source: Polish Steel Association (2015). 
Impact on steel prices 
As discussed in above, previous studies show that the iron & steel sector in Europe passes 
through 60-100% of the costs of the EU ETS to its products. Therefore, it is likely that a part of 
the price development of Polish steel is to some extent impacted by the EU ETS.  
As shown in Figure 21, between 2008 and 2014, the price of a hot rolled sheet of steel11 has 
fluctuated between approximately €450 and €600 per sheet. The price saw a stark drop in 2009 
dropping from around €600 to €450 in one year. After 2009, the price started to go up, reaching 
€600 in 2011. Since 2011, the average price of hot rolled sheet has dropped slightly to around 
€500. The economic crisis is likely to be at least a partial reason for the decrease in price in 
2009.  
 
  
                                                          
11 Hot rolled sheet a sheet of metal with dimensions 1500 x 3000 x 4 mm. Average prices are based on 
data collected weekly from trading companies - members of the Polish Union of Steel Distributors. Prices 
are converted to euros with an exchange rate of 1 PLN = €0.24. 
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Figure 21. Average price of hot rolled sheet, 2008-14 (€) 
 
Data source: KOBiZE, 2015 and Steel Price Index. 
3.2.3 Social Impacts 
Impacts on employment 
In terms of social impacts, we have not identified a direct link between climate change policies 
and employment figures in the iron & steel sector. 
The largest changes in employment have actually taken place prior to the implementation of the 
climate change policies analysed in this study. After 2009, employment has continued to 
decrease but the change has been considerably slower compared to previous periods. While the 
sector employed 26 00 workers in 2009, in 2013 the figure has gone down to 22 000.  
Employment figures in steel and iron sector show a strong negative trend in 1990 – 2013. During 
the socialist period, the steel and iron sector was over-staffed (Trappmann 2013; 38). In 1990, 
the sector employed more than 140 000 people while in 2013, the figure has gone down to 22 
000 workers. (Eurostat, 2015) AlcelorMittal is the biggest individual employer with 12 000 
employees in Poland (AlcelorMittal: 2015).  
Figure 22. Employment in Polish iron & steel plants, 1990-2013 
 
Data source: EUROSTAT (2015). 
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3.2.4 Environmental impacts  
GHG emissions 
We are aware that many international, EU-level and national policies (e.g. the EU’s Industrial 
Emissions Directive, IED) are impacting the environmental performance of the iron & steel 
sector, but in order to limit the scope of this study, we concentrate the analysis on the effects of 
the EU ETS and RES policies on GHG emissions.  
 
Figure 23. Verified CO₂ emissions in steel & iron sector, 2008-14 (thousands of tonnes of CO₂) 
 
Data source: EUTL (2015). 
Emissions of the iron & steel sector have decreased significantly from 2008 (13.6 million 
tonnes). In 2009, the CO₂ emissions decreased to 9.575,137 tonnes. After 2009, CO₂ emissions 
increased again until 2013 (12 million tonnes) and dropped slightly in 2014 (11.9 million tonnes). 
When comparing Figures 20 and 23, it can be observed that the trend in GHG emissions has 
followed the sector’s production trend. Production and GHG emissions both experienced a large 
drop in 2009 and increased again in 2010. Thus, the decrease in GHG emissions in 2009 is to a 
large extent related to lower production figures of steel that year, due to the economic and 
financial crisis.  
At the same time, previous studies at the European level have established some links between 
the EU ETS and emission patterns (Egenhofer et al, 2011; Laing et al, 2013; see also the 
discussion in the section on the electricity sector above). Even in the case of over-allocation 
(during 2008-12), the existence of the EU ETS and RES policies, may therefore have exerted a 
downward pressure on the emissions in the Polish iron & steel sector. 
As discussed in chapter 3.1.2, carbon leakage is frequently seen as the major negative 
environmental impacts of climate change policies. Evidence of carbon leakage would mean that 
in the case of iron and steel production in Poland, climate change policies would directly or 
indirectly cause GHG emissions to be displaced from Poland to another jurisdiction where less 
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GHG constraints are in place. Since this study observes a relatively low cost from climate policies 
to the sector, no carbon leakage, and negative environmental impact, has been identified.  
 
  
Summary: Impacts of climate policies (EU ETS and RES policies) on the Polish iron & steel sector 
Economic impacts 
 Costs: The combined cost impacts (direct and indirect costs) from the EU ETS and RES 
policies, notably the green certificate system, have been relatively low. In addition, due to 
strong measures so as to avoid carbon leakage (free allocation, see chapter 4), the sector 
has actually benefited from windfall profits, certainly during the 2008-12 period. 
 Trade: We have not identified any major impacts of climate change policies to exports and 
imports of steel. 
 Investments: The indirect cost from RES policies and the EU ETS, translated into higher 
electricity bills of iron and steel sector, might to some extent incentivize for investments to 
technology that uses less electricity. No negative impact due to carbon leakage can be 
identified. 
 Production and capacity: Climate policies such as the EU ETS or the green certificate system 
may play a role, but there is a lack of available data to establish a cause-and-effect 
relationship. 
 Prices: It is likely that a part of the price development of Polish steel is to some extent 
impacted by the EU ETS. 
 
Social impacts 
 Employment: In terms of social impacts, we have not identified a direct link between 
climate change policies and employment figures in the iron and steel sector. 
 
Environmental impacts 
 GHG emissions: The existence of the EU ETS and RES policies, may have exerted a 
downward pressure on GHG emissions in the Polish iron and steel sector. No negative 
impact due to carbon leakage can be identified.  
We found a series of negative and positive impacts ranging from direct costs, which are to a 
significant extent passed through to end-users and GHG emission reductions attributable to climate 
policies. All in all, it can be observed that impacts from climate change policies have been fairly 
modest. Possible impact of EU ETS on price development of Polish steel is the most significant 
observed impact. 
 39 
4 Mitigation of impacts of climate change policies  
The way in which the impacts of climate change policies on the three dimensions of sustainable 
development are managed will determine whether sustainable development is being achieved. 
The long-term promise of win-win may be true, but in the short term adjustments will need to 
be made, and a safety net needs to be put in place. 
That safety net includes domestic measures to mitigate impacts put in place by the government, 
but also tools or measures put in place at the European and international level that are relevant 
for Poland. 
Without claiming to be exhaustive, the next sections first describe the domestic, then the 
European and finally the international tools that mitigate the negative impacts (costs, 
employment, trade, investments, production and capacity, prices, and environment) of the 
selected climate policies (i.e. EU ETS and RES policies) in the Polish electricity and iron & steel 
sectors. 
For the specific case of Poland, it makes sense to also include tools or programmes that were 
put in place to smoothen the broader transitions which took place in Polish society, but which 
also affected GHG emissions. Notably this includes the economic transformation in the 1990s, 
and the accession of Poland to the EU in the 2000s, that is the tools that are designed to tackle 
specific climate policy impacts (e.g. free allocation in the EU ETS).  
4.1 Domestic mitigation tools 
4.1.1 Green Investment Scheme 
Most of the Green Investment Scheme (GIS) projects are addressing GHG emissions directly (e.g. 
financial assistance to construct biomass heat and power plants). However, several of them 
simultaneously lead to lower energy and electricity use, and can therefore be considered as a 
flanking measure to mitigate the impacts of increased electricity prices. An example of this is the 
case of the energy-efficient street lighting project as well as the energy management in public 
buildings programme (see the list below).  
As the scheme is essentially based on revenues from foreign financial sources (i.e. other 
countries such as Spain, Japan, Ireland, etc.), it can also be argued that it mitigates part of the 
costs associated with GHG emission reduction efforts. This is valid for all eight programmes 
listed below, including the construction and reconstruction of electricity networks to connect 
wind power sources to the grid. 
Under the GIS, Poland uses the revenues resulting from the sale of its surplus amounts of AAUs 
(Assigned Amount Units) under the Kyoto Protocol, to invest in climate-friendly projects. As a 
result of the restructuring in the 1990s, Poland had a large surplus of AAUs. This excess (and the 
surpluses in other Eastern European countries) causes the buyers’ preferences to matter, and as 
such, Poland decided to engage in AAU trading under its Green Investment Scheme with inter 
alia the World Bank’s Spanish Carbon Fund and the Carbon Fund for Europe. The GIS is managed 
by the National Fund for Environmental Protection and Water Management (see National Fund 
for Environmental Protection and Water Management, 2015). 
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Consequently, under the GIS, Poland needs to assure buyers that the proceeds from the sale of 
AAUs are used to finance agreed projects, and follow-up with credible monitoring and 
verification process. Poland has so far engaged in the following projects (see National Fund for 
Environmental Protection and Water Management, 2015): 
1. energy management in public service buildings  
2. agricultural biogas works  
3. biomass heat and power plants  
4. construction and reconstruction of electricity networks for connecting 
renewable wind energy sources  
5. energy management in buildings of selected public sector entities  
6. energy-efficient street lighting  
7. a low-emission urban transport  
8. standard of installing hiding places for birds and bats as an element of heat 
insulation  
4.1.2 Thermo-modernisation Fund 
This Fund can be considered as a flanking measure that mitigates cost impacts for the residential 
sector related to increased energy prices and affordability of energy, mainly related to heat. As 
such, it falls outside the scope of the electricity and iron & steel sectors, but it offers 
nevertheless a useful example of a measure put in place to mitigate energy-related costs. 
The Thermo-modernization Programme and Fund, established in 1998, offers thermo-
modernization bonuses as a form of financial assistance from the state to clients who want to 
carry out energy efficiency projects, mainly in the residential sector. The fund is still operational 
today and is operated by the Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego (Poland's only state-owned bank). 
At present, bonuses are paid out at 25% of the loan used for such an enterprise. An investor 
who carries out a thermo-modernization investments (e.g. installing insulation) pays off only 
three quarters of the amount used for the loan. Bonuses can be acquired by housing co-
operatives, commercial law partnerships, housing associations, as well as natural persons (Bank 
Gospodarstwa Krajowego, 2015; see also Rekiel, 2014). 
4.1.3 Support for micro-installations under the 2015 Renewable Energy Act 
As this measure supports households to consume and produce electricity themselves, it 
represents an important flanking measure to mitigate the impacts related to rising electricity 
prices for households that is observed in recent years, including due to climate policies.  
As referred to in Chapter 2, the new Renewable Energy Act contains an important provision 
related to support for prosumers, or users that both consume and produce electricity (e.g. 
rooftop solar PV panels in households). It is estimated that up to 200 000 such prosumers in 
Poland could profit from this provision (Ancygier, 2015; Enerdata, 2015). Prosumers will receive 
PLN 0.75/kWh (€18c/kWh) for micro-installations up to 3 kW, while micro-installations between 
3 and 10 kW will receive up to PLN 0.7/kWh (€16.9c/kWh), depending on the renewable 
technology (Enerdata, 2015).  
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4.1.4 Coal industry subsidies 
The various programmes under which subsidies are granted to the coal industry, have alleviated 
many of the social (employment) concerns within the coal sector in Poland and demonstrated 
the importance of social dialogue in smoothening transitions.  
In the context of the restructuring of the coal industry, started in the 1990s but still ongoing, the 
Polish government has been providing significant support to the sector. The economic transition 
included the restructuring of previously inefficient industries such as coal mining. Such 
industries usually are unable to restructure without state aid, either because of the large costs 
involved, or because of resistance from highly organized and powerful labour unions.  
In Poland, both factors played an important role. While over-employment and high production 
costs resulted in an untenable situation for the coal mines, early government efforts (in 1992-
1993) failed to address the issue. Only in 1998, a partial success was achieved by the adoption of 
a program endorsed by the Solidarity trade union, which included funding to close mines and 
the provision of significant amounts of social benefits (Suwala, 2010). 
After accession to the EU, state aid to the sector was limited in order to be compatible with the 
common market EU state aid rules.12 State aid that was still allowed included, in general, historic 
liabilities including managing safety risks at closed mines, entitlements by retired employees to 
free coal, other benefits paid to redundant miners and other costs associated with mine closures 
such as the clean-up of damages of past mining activities (IEA, 2011, p. 92).  
The International Energy Agency reports that state aid paid to the sector was as high as approx. 
PLN 1700 million (€390 million) in 1990 and decreased to about PLN 400 million (€92 million) by 
2009-10 (see Figure 24). More recently, total liabilities are estimated to amount to PLN 2.7 
billion (€0.62 billion), for the years 2008-15 (IEA, 2011, pp. 92-93). 
  
                                                          
12 European Council Regulation 1407/2002 is on state aid to the coal industry. Decision No. K(2005)1796 
and Decision No. K(2007)1943 relate specifically to Poland. 
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Figure 24. State aid paid to the Polish hard-coal sector (1999-2009, in million PLN) 
 
Data source: IEA (2011, p. 93). 
4.1.5 Iron & steel restructuring packages 
Similar to the coal sector, social packages were put in place in the steel sector to alleviate the 
negative social impacts of the restructuring process started in the 1990s. 
Reduction in employment took place in three phases, “natural” outflows up to 1998, state-led 
between 1999 and 2003 and, under the influence of EU accession, company-led from 2004 
onwards. In the period between 1999 and 2003, two sectoral tripartite agreements, the 
Steelworkers’ Social Package (Hutniczy Pakiet Socjalny, HPS) signed in 1999, and the 
Steelworkers’ Activation Package (Hutniczy Pakiet Aktywizujacy, HPA) signed in 2003. Both 
packages were targeted at accelerating downsizing (Trappman, 2011, p. 11).  
The cost of the packages was shared by the companies, the Polish Ministry of Economy and the 
EU and included benefits for early retirement, support for training and retraining and alternative 
job creation.  European Commission DG Competition reports that Poland granted a total amount 
of PLN 2.75 billion (€625 million) in the period 1997-2003 as state aid to the sector (European 
Commission, 2005: 99). 
As in the case of the social programmes in the coal sector, social dialogue with labour unions 
(and particularly with one union that was very influential, called Solidarity) combined with the 
necessary funding, went a long way to mitigate the unemployment impacts from the transition. 
4.2 EU-level tools 
4.2.1 Free allocation in the EU ETS 
At the European level, the key tool to mitigate direct carbon costs from the EU ETS – costs that 
potentially lead to carbon leakage and other impacts as described in the previous chapter – is 
free allocation of allowances.  
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In phases 1 and 2 of the EU ETS (2005-07 and 2008-12), most allowances were distributed free 
of charge. In phase 1, caps were set through European Commission-approved National 
Allocation Plans, and a maximum of 5% of allowances auctioned. The rest was allocated free of 
charge on the basis of estimates of historical emissions. 
In phase 2, allocations were granted on the basis of the reported emissions in the first phase. 
The amount of allowances that could be auctioned was also increased, to a maximum of 10% of 
the total. In addition, international units produced through the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI) were also good for compliance (see section 4.3 below),  
The functioning of the ETS saw some significant changes at the start of phase 3 as allocation is 
now done at the EU level. In general, free allocation decreased and auctioning of allowances 
increased, with more than 40% of all allowances to be auctioned. In principle, no free allocation 
is given any longer to the power sector, while the amount of free allocation in phase 3 for 
energy intensive industry is determined on the basis of historical activity levels and efficiency 
benchmarks, and an overall cross-sectoral correction factor (CSCF) which ensures that the 
overall number of allowances given away does not compromise the overall cap of the ETS (see 
also below). 
A. Free allocation for the electricity sector in Poland 
For the years analysed in the previous chapter (2008-14), Table 15 shows the total volume of 
allocated allowances to the 74 Polish electricity installations under the ETS (public power 
stations and public CHP plants in the EU ETS as identified in the previous chapter). It also shows 
the yearly average EUA market prices and, based on those figures gives an indicative total value 
of those allowances per year. In 2008, the total value was 3.06 billion euro, going down to about 
€1.77-1.06 billion in 2009-12, and further decreasing in 2013 (€343 million) and 2014 (€253 
million). 
Table 15. Free allocations, prices and total value of free allocations in the Polish power sector, 
2008-14 
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Free allocation 
(million allowances) 
132.96 133.19 135.40 135.66 140.70 76.15* 42.79* 
Yearly average EUA 
market price (€) 
€23.03 €13.31 €14.48 €13.77 €7.56 €4.50 €5.92 
Total value of free 
allocations (billion 
€) 
€3.06 €1.77 €1.96 €1.87 €1.06 €0.343 €0.253 
* These figures include transitional free allocation for electricity generation, and free allocation for heat 
produced in public CHP plants. 
Data source: EUTL, 2015 and European Energy Exchange, 2015. 
In principle, free allowances mitigate costs for installations that would otherwise need to buy 
allowances or make investments that reduce GHG emissions. However, as argued in detail in the 
previous chapter, the free allowances have actually generated a substantial amount of windfall 
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profits for the power sector, because of a very high pass through rates in the electricity prices 
(even when allowances are freely allocated). 
 
That is one of the reasons why the sector, as of phase 3, has in principle the obligation to buy all 
their allocations. However, Poland has obtained the permission to continue the use of 
temporary free allocations for the power sector. Transitional or temporary free allocation 
represents a major derogation from the general rule. The EU therefore made it subject to 
several conditions, as described by the European Commission (European Commission, 2012a): 
 It must finish in 2019 at the latest; 
 It is limited to no more than 70% of emissions for domestic electricity supply in 2013, 
declining annually thereafter; 
 The value of the free allowances must be channelled into investments in retrofitting and 
upgrading the country's energy infrastructure, including new power plants and 
diversification of the energy mix and sources of supply, and into clean technologies. 
These investments have to be set out in a national plan. 
 The Commission must assess the application for consistency with the rules of the ETS 
Directive. 
 
In the case of Poland, we do indeed see a decrease in free allowances from 132-140 million 
throughout phase 2, down to 76 and 42 million allowances in 2013 and 2014, the first two years 
of phase 3. The associated total value of the allowances, in combination with significantly lower 
average EUA prices, also declined (see Table 15). 
In summary, free allocation has (more than) mitigated the direct cost impacts of EU ETS for the 
sector. However, it did not prevent price increases for end-users, including households, services 
and industry. 
 
B. Free allocation for the Polish iron & steel sector 
In phase 2 (2008-12), the Polish iron & steel sector was over-allocated, receiving more free 
allowances than they actually needed to comply with the cap. As of phase 3 (2013-20), energy 
intensive industries receive part of their allocation for free, but have to get the rest through 
auctions.  
Allocation to the iron and steel industries are determined by using product benchmarks,13 
according to Decision 2011/27/EU.14 The average carbon-intensity of the 10% best performers 
                                                          
13  Benchmarks for the iron and steel industry are reported in Methodology for the free allocation of 
emission allowances in the EU ETS post 2012. Sector report for the iron and steel industry. Study 
commissioned by the European Commission to Ecofys (project leader); Fraunhofer Institute for Systems 
and Innovation Research; and Öko-Institut. Available at: 
  http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/cap/allocation/docs/bm_study-iron_and_steel_en.pdf 
14  Commission Decision determining transitional Union-wide rules for harmonised free allocation of 
emission allowances pursuant to Article 10a of Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council (2011/278/EU) 
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represents the benchmark for allocating free emissions. Steel making (NACE v.2 sector 24.10) 
and the casting of iron tubes (NACE v.2 sector 24.21) are included in the carbon leakage list 
(Renda et al., 2013).Those installations that meet the benchmark receive all their allowances for 
free. Those installations that do not meet the benchmark, receive a lower amount of free 
allocation, and are thereby incentivized to catch up to their best-performing peers.  
 
BOF steel makers are also entitled to receive free allowances for the electricity generated 
through recycling of waste gases. Although free allocation of allowances for electricity 
production is prohibited, an exception is provided for waste gas electricity (Art 10A.1 of the ETS 
Directive). 
Table 16. Free allocations, prices and total value of free allocations in the iron & steel sector, 
2008-14 
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Free allocation 
(million 
allowances) 
14.2 14.2 14.2 14.3 14.4 11.0 10.6 
Yearly average EUA 
market price (€) 
€23.03 €13.31 €14.48 €13.77 €7.56 €4.50 €5.92 
Total value of free 
allocations (million 
€) 
€326.9 €188.9 €205.8 €197.8 €109.0 €49.6 €63.0 
Data source: EUTL, 2015 and European Energy Exchange, 2015. 
As shown in Table 16, the total value of freely allocated allowances to the iron & steel sector, 
calculated on the basis of yearly average EUA market prices, was as high as €326.9 million in 
2008, fluctuated between €205.8 and €109.0 million between 2009 and 2012, and dropped to 
€49.6 million (2013) and €63 million (2014) in the first years of phase 3. The latter drop in value 
is due to both stricter limits on free allowances because of the benchmark approach in phase 3 
and lower average EUA prices. 
Again, in principle, free allowances mitigate costs for installations that would otherwise need to 
buy allowances or make investments that reduce GHG emissions. Analogous to the electricity 
sector however, the free allowances have actually generated a substantial amount of windfall 
profits for the iron & steel sector, because of a 60-100% pass-through rate in the prices of steel 
(even when allowances are freely allocated). In addition, the Polish iron & steel sector was over-
allocated throughout 2008-12, and was only short starting from 2013 (see above). 
 
It can be concluded that free allocation has (more than) mitigated the direct cost impacts of EU 
ETS for the sector. However, free allocation has not necessarily prevented other impacts such as 
steel price increases for end-users.  
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4.2.2 State aid to mitigate indirect costs from the EU ETS 
In another attempt to stem risks related to carbon leakage, a new measure has been introduced 
in phase 3 (art. 10A.6 of the Directive), which allows EU member states to grant state aid 
(financial compensation) to compensate indirect carbon costs caused by higher prices for 
electricity. 
Although state aid is allowed under EU ETS rules, and there is evidence that suggests indirect 
costs for the steel industry in Poland (see previous chapter), the country has not notified the 
Commission of any such aid to its industry (see EU Competition and Regulatory, 2014). 
4.2.3 Operational Programme Infrastructure and Environment for the years 2007-13 and 
2014-20 
Finally, within the framework of the 'Convergence' objective, the EU co-funds the Operational 
Programme Infrastructure and Environment for the years 2007-13 / and its follow-up 
programme for the years 2014-20. These are very large infrastructure funding programmes, 
with funding of over €30 billion each, largely met by funds from the Cohesion Fund and the 
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF).   
Specifically the last programme, for the years 2014-20 has a very strong focus on financially 
assisting Poland to transition towards a low GHG emission economy, with explicit references to 
Polish 2020 RE and GHG targets, in addition to a strong focus on transport and railway 
development. In that sense, these programmes can be considered as mitigating some of the 
Polish government’s costs in developing the necessary but costly low emission infrastructure. 
4.3  International tools 
4.3.1 World Bank support 
The World Bank has been assisting Poland since the early 1990s with various transition-related 
programmes, and has contributed funding (loans) for e.g. the social packages in the coal sector 
(World Bank, 2001). It has also played a pivotal role in the development of the Polish Green 
Investment Scheme, by providing capacity and liaising with funders, resulting in e.g. the sale of 
AAUs through the World Bank’s Spanish Carbon Fund (World Bank, 2012). 
4.3.2 DM and Joint Implementation  
Other international tools that assisted to offset some of the costs due to climate policies, 
particularly in the context of the EU ETS, is the access granted to international credits from the 
CDM (Certified Emission Reductions or CERs), and the development of Joint Implementation 
projects (producing Emission Reduction Credits, ERUs).  
With regard to Joint Implementation, under which Poland can act as a host country, 37 projects 
were implemented between 2008 and 2012, resulting in total actual GHG emission reductions of 
25 Mt CO2-eq during that period. The resulting ERUs were mostly transferred to international 
firms, carbon brokers, German and Japanese industrial concerns and some banks. In addition, 
one of the purchasers was a Danish governmental agency (KOBiZE, 2014). These JI projects are 
therefore another source of funding for GHG abatement projects for Poland. 
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Industrial players in the EU ETS were also allowed access to international credits, with CERs from 
the CDM accounting for the lion’s share. For the entire period between 2008 and 2020, 
approximately 1600-1700 credits (CERs and ERUs) are allowed to be used for compliance. In 
total EU operators used 1059 million credits during 2008-12 and swapped 133 million credits in 
2013, leaving another 400-500 million credits to be used for compliance between 2014 and 2020 
(World Bank, 2014: 109).  
As these credits are generally much cheaper than EUAs (CER prices dropped to €0.3-0.4 in 2013 
and remained low in subsequent years), this can also be considered as a cost mitigation 
measure. 
4.4 Potential international and EU-level mitigation tools 
There are several other European and international venues that Poland can consider to use as 
flanking measures to mitigate negative impacts from climate polices. These include: 
 
 NER 300 (innovation fund) for renewable energy and CCS projects 
 The proposed EU ETS Modernization Fund (post-2020) 
 EU-level R&D funding  
 International carbon markets 
Under the NER 300, only 1 Polish project has been implemented so far, in the first call for 
projects: the BIOg CEG Plant Goswinowice. This project is a bio-ethanol production plant with 
total project funding of €30 million (adjusted funding rate, €/MWh: 29.4; see European 
Commission, 2015f). It cannot really be considered as mitigating any negative impacts described 
in chapter 3, but other projects under this programme may still be developed. 
In the proposal for the reform of the EU ETS post-2020, a Modernization Fund is also on the 
table, which could again assist Poland and other poorer EU member states in their transition 
towards a more modern and energy efficient, and thus less GHG-intense economy. 
Another important venue, specifically for the electricity and iron & steel sector, pertains to the 
EU channels available to support R&D and innovation such as Horizon 2020 and other 
mechanisms which are increasingly focusing on low-GHG or more energy efficient technologies. 
A final option depends on the developments of the international negotiation process, and 
includes the future use of international carbon markets, either project-based or otherwise, in 
the global climate regime. 
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5 Conclusion 
This case study looked at the low-GHG emissions transition that has arguably been initiated in 
Poland and studied whether the transition is being undertaken in a sustainable way, by 
examining the impacts of climate policies on the three dimensions of sustainable development 
(social, environmental and economic) and identifying the measures put in place to mitigate 
them. 
There are at present a host of international, EU and Polish policies, laws and programmes 
intended to guide this transition. Two important ones that were analysed in-depth in this case 
study are the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) and Renewable Energy support (RES) 
policies. With regard to RES policies, the most important operational policy during the past 10 
years is the Polish system of green certificates, which also creates a market and therefore a cost 
for participating industries. 
In the chapter on impacts, we found a series of negative and positive impacts for the two 
sectors that we focused on, namely electricity and iron & steel. These impacts range from direct 
costs, which are to a significant extent passed through to end-users, rising electricity prices, 
especially for households, a small but notable change in electricity production figures, namely 
away from coal and towards biomass and (some) wind power, and GHG emissions reductions 
attributable to the climate policies in both sectors, just to name some of the most significant 
ones. 
But there is also a whole range of mitigation policies put in place in Poland, both at the domestic 
and European but also at the international level. In addition to very specific mitigation measures 
addressing concrete climate policy-related impacts such as free allocation in the EU ETS, we also 
identified a number of social programmes that were used to tackle negative (social) impacts 
from the transition in the 1990s. The programmes are interesting to look at in the context of this 
study, not only because they arguably mitigate (a fraction of the) current impact of climate 
policies, but also because they provide lessons as to how Poland has mitigated the impacts of 
other, but related, transitions. 
One of the lessons learned from this case study is that financial resources, combined with social 
dialogue, can alleviate some of society’s resistance to transitions, including the transition 
towards a low-GHG economy. Another important message is that at present, the negative 
impacts of climate policies in Poland are relatively mild, while in the future, it is likely that 
sufficient mitigation measures can be put in place to address possible negative impacts. 
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Annex I: International, EU level and national level climate related policies 
International climate change related policies 
 
4. The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer which was 
adopted in 1987, was designed to reduce the production and consumption of ozone 
depleting substances. These substances are often used in refrigeration, air-
conditioning, foam manufacturing, aerosol production, and fire extinguishing. The 
Montreal Protocol aims to reduce these substances in the atmosphere so as to 
protect the ozone layer. Poland has ratified the Montreal Protocol in 1990. 
 
5. The 1979 Geneva Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP) 
was the first international agreement to tackle air pollution on a transnational 
(regional) basis. It has since been extended by 8 different protocols. The history of 
the Convention dates back to the 1960s, when the link between sulphur emissions 
in continental Europe and the acidification of Scandinavian lakes became clear. The 
protocols also cover other air pollutants in addition to SO2 and reducing these 
pollutants in some cases also contributes to the reduction of greenhouse gases, with 
the adoption on rules for reducing particulate matter, including black carbon, in a 
2012 amendment to the Gothenburg Protocol as a case in point (UNECE 2012). 
 
6. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) agreed to establish a global 
market-based mechanism (MBM) in an effort to address the rapidly rising GHG 
emissions of the international aviation sector. By 2016 the mechanism should be 
developed and it should enter into force by 2020. The agreement also mentions 
technical and operational measures for mitigating emissions, among which biofuels 
and the possibility of member states implementing a separate MBM in the period 
up to the establishment of an international mechanism (Source: ICAO report of the 
executive committee 38th session of agenda item 17 – section on climate change). 
Interviews with stakeholders have indicated that the most likely candidate for global 
implementation is an offsetting mechanism. Costs would be kept low by allowing 
carbon units from a wide variety of offsetting mechanisms (including the CDM and 
possibly REDD+). This would be coupled with a previously confirmed aspirational 
goal of carbon neutral growth of the aviation sector after 2020. 
 
7. In the International Maritime Organization (IMO), a global market-based measure 
(MBM) to mitigate GHG emissions is also under discussion. MBMs under 
consideration include an offsetting fund financed by a tax on bunker fuels, an 
energy efficiency crediting and trading scheme and a global ETS for international 
shipping. Concerns from developing countries are taken on board by discussions on 
mitigation of adverse effects, for instance through a rebate mechanism 
compensating developing countries (IMO 2015). The EU has been active both 
domestically and internationally (in the IMO) to develop market based instruments 
in the international maritime sector (European Commission, 2013). It is supporting 
discussions on a global ETS by preparing for its possible implementation: MRV 
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requirements have been set in emissions from large vessels (over 5000 gross 
tonnage) visiting EU ports 2018 onwards.  
 
EU level climate change related policies 
 
4. The Effort Sharing Decision (ESD) establishes national emission targets for 2020 in 
non-ETS sectors. These targets are based on 2005 levels. They have been calculated 
on the basis of member states’ relative wealth (measured by GDP per capita). The 
targets range from a 20% emissions reduction to a 20% increase. By 2020, Poland is 
allowed to increase its emissions by 14%. 
 
5. The CCS Directive promotes the development of CCS in the EU. CCS is considered 
essential to achieve the EU’s long-run GHG emissions reductions target, considering 
the “theoretical limits to efficiency and the inevitability of some process emissions 
remaining in certain industrial sectors” (EC 2030 Framework Communication). At the 
same time, the high costs of CCS serve as a barrier to uptake, including in Poland. 
 
6. The 2012 Energy Efficiency Directive contains a collection of binding measures to 
help the EU reach its 20% energy efficiency target by 2020. EU Member states were 
required to transpose the Directive into their national laws by June 2014. Member 
States have set their own indicative national targets, which, dependent on country 
preferences can be based on primary or final energy consumption, primary or final 
energy savings, or energy intensity. Poland has set itself an indicative target of 
reducing primary energy consumption by 13.6 Mtoe, compared to 2020 projections. 
In conditions of economic growth, this would mean an improvement in the energy 
efficiency of the economy. 
 
7. The 2010 Energy Performance of Buildings Directive outlines, first, that energy 
performance certificates should be included in all advertisements for the sale or 
rental of buildings in the EU. EU member states must further establish inspection 
schemes for heating and air conditioning systems in building, while all new buildings 
must be nearly zero energy building by the end of 2020. New minimum energy 
performance requirements are to be put in place, and member states have to 
develop a set of national financial measures to promote energy efficiency in 
buildings (European Commission, 2015c). 
 
8. The Fuel Quality Directive requires a reduction of the greenhouse gas intensity of 
the fuels used in vehicles by 6 % by 2020, and it also regulates the sustainability of 
biofuels. It has previously led to drastic reductions in the sulphur content of fuels, 
enabling the deployment of vehicle technologies to reduce greenhouse gas and air 
pollutant emissions, and delivering substantial health and environmental benefits. 
The Fuel Quality Directive applies to all petrol, diesel and biofuels used in road 
transport, as well as to gasoil used in non-road-mobile machinery.  
 
9. EU legislation on Car Standards sets binding emission reduction targets for new cars. 
This legislation is a key part of Europe’s strategy to improve the fuel economy of 
cars sold on the market. Similar legislation and targets are in place for new vans. The 
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rules requires that new cars registered in the EU do not emit more than 130 grams 
of CO2 per km on average by 2015. By 2021, the fleet average to be achieved by all 
new cars is 95 grams of CO2 per km (European Commission, 2015b). 
 
10. The F-gas Regulation obliges inter alia the heating, cooling and refrigeration 
industry to regulate and sharply reduce the use of HFCs (which have a global 
warming potential 11700 times greater than CO2) in appliances. This requires 
additional investments, but can also reward early movers on the global market for 
technological alternatives. A new Regulation (Regulation (EU) No 517/2014), which 
replaces the 2006 Regulation (EC) No 842/2006 and applies from 1 January 2015, 
strengthens the existing measures and introduces a number of far-reaching changes. 
By 2030 it will cut the EU’s f-gas emissions by two-thirds compared to 2014 levels.  
 
National level policies 
 
5. Poland’s Climate Policy: The strategies for greenhouse gas emission reductions in 
Poland until 2020; was adopted in October 2003. Its strategic goal is to let Poland 
join in the efforts of the international community to protect the global climate 
through introducing sustainable development. However, this document stems from 
Poland’s pre-accession period, is outdated and has no practical relevance (Dreblow 
et al., 2013, p. 2). 
 
6. Polish Strategic Plan for Adaptation to Climate Change (SPA2020) with the 
perspective by 2030 was developed by the Ministry of Environment and adopted in 
2013. It documents current domestic impacts of climate change and develops future 
impact scenarios, including for a number of vulnerable sectors and regions in 
Poland. It also sets up a series of adaptation measures for each affected region and 
sector and ensures the mainstreaming of adaptation into sectoral policies, primarily 
those related to agriculture and forestry, biodiversity, ecosystems and water 
resources, coastal zones and infrastructure. As a result of adopting the Plan by the 
Council of Ministers all big cities will elaborate their Adaptation Plans that should 
follow the SPA. The elaboration of the City Plans is financed by the National Fund for 
Environmental Protection and Water Management. 
 
7. As part of the various international and EU policies listed in Chapter 2.2, Poland 
needs to meet a series of national targets on EE and biofuels: 
 Under the EU Effort Sharing Decision (ESD), Poland needs to limit the 
growth of its GHG emissions not covered by the EU ETS to 14% above 
2005 levels by 2020. Total emissions in 2013 were already about 10% 
above 2005 levels (EEA 2014: 51; see Figure 13). 
 In addition, Poland faces a non-binding target to reduce energy 
consumption by 20% of the projected 2020 levels. 
 
8. The 2009 Energy Policy of Poland until 2030 establishes a vision of Poland’s energy 
future, based on the following 6 ‘directions’: 
 To improve energy efficiency; 
 To enhance security of fuel and energy supplies; 
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 To diversify the electricity generation structure by introducing nuclear 
energy; 
 To develop the use of renewable energy sources, including biofuels; 
 To develop competitive fuel and energy markets; 
 To reduce the environmental impact of the power industry. 
 
The document does not explicitly set priorities and specifications of the desired 
energy mix through 2030, but does include, in an appendix, a projection for the 
demand for fuels and energy until 2030. It also reiterates Poland’s 15% RE by 2020 
target and commits Poland to ”devise a path” to reach it (p. 18). The policy is 
currently undergoing review. Changes in the generation structure foreseen at the 
origin are not happening – nuclear power won’t be built before 2030 – if at all. The 
revised energy policy will look at trends up until 2050 with new projections, but 
these remain to be decided at the time of writing. 
 
9. The Act of 15 April 2011 on Energy Efficiency lays down the national target for 
energy management in the economy until 2016 at the level of 9% of the average 
national final energy consumption, averaged from 2001-2005. One of the basic 
mechanisms of the Act is the introduction of the system of energy efficiency 
certificates, the so-called “white certificates”, which confirm that measures leading 
to specific energy savings have been taken, including:  
 the modernisation of local heating networks and heat sources; 
 buildings; 
 lighting systems; 
 household appliances; and  
 equipment used in industrial processes. 
 
10. The Act of 25 August 2006 on Bio-components and Liquid Biofuels and the Long-term 
Program to Promote Biofuels or Other Renewable Fuels for 2008–2014 include 
measures to enhance and promote the use of biofuels for transport (e.g. excise duty 
exemptions), that are built upon in Poland’s energy policy and national renewable 
energy plan to achieve its 10% biofuels target by 2020.  
 
11. The Operational Programme Infrastructure and Environment 2007 – 2013, is a 
European Commission approved programme for the years 2007 – 2013, and had a 
total budget of €37.56 billion, with €22.18 billion from the Cohesion Fund and €5.74 
billion from the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF). It aimed to support 
the development of technical infrastructure, while simultaneously improving 
environmental protection and health as well as preserving cultural identity and 
developing territorial cohesion. It covered a wide variety of infrastructure works – 
many of them relevant to climate change – including in the transport, waste, energy 
(including renewables), education and health care sectors (European Commission, 
2015b). Attention for climate change efforts was stepped up in the follow-up 
programme, Operational Programme Infrastructure and Environment 2014 – 2020, 
which has a total budget of €32.27 billion. It mainly concentrates its resources on 
transport infrastructure (including on railway development), the development of a 
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low-carbon economy, and climate change adaptation, risk prevention & 
management and environment protection (European Commission, 2015g). 
 
12. The Transport Development Strategy for 2020 (with the prospect of 2030) is also 
directly and indirectly related to climate efforts in Poland. It translates, for instance, 
the EU target to achieve a 10% share of biofuels in the transport fuel market and 
has, more generally, as one of its objectives to limit the negative impacts of 
transport on the environment, based on the following principles: 
 diversity and complementarity of the modal balance of transport 
connections within the system; 
 domestic and international aspects; 
 organisation of transport solutions that are least polluting; 
 manage demand for transport; 
 implementation of modern transport technologies reducing 
negative impacts of transport on the environment. 
 
The strategy on transport development is accompanied by a range of specific 
policies, regulations and programmes, with those on rail transport being most 
relevant for climate change, namely the Master Plan for Rail Transport in Poland 
until 2030 (2008) and the Long-Term Rail Investment Programme until 2013 with an 
Outlook until 2015 (2011). As road transportation is the only sector with rapidly 
growing GHG emissions, the development of a rail network seems to be the best 
remedy that would redirect the load of commodities from roads to railways thus 
limiting long range road transport.  
 
In addition to this list of policies, legislations and infrastructural/development 
programmes that are relevant for climate change, Poland has also been working on 
a National Programme for the Development of a Low-Carbon Economy. The Ministry 
of Economy is responsible for the work and a set of assumptions has been were 
adopted by Poland’s Council of Ministers on 16 August 2011. According to these 
assumptions, the programme should help to generate economic, social and 
environmental benefits resulting from the reduction of GHG emissions, up to 2050. 
By 2015, unfortunately, no significant progress has been made (see also Ministry of 
Economy, 2015b). 
